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[541] 
Law in Hiding: 
Market Principles in the 
Global Legal Order 
Odette Lienau* 
Standing in the background of the global legal order are a range of what might be called 
“market principles” or “market givens”collective presentations or beliefs about how 
markets workwhich are treated as objective descriptions at a particular time and place. 
This Article argues that such market givens should be understood as a kind of “law in 
hiding,” shaping the policy space available to states and other actors and affecting global 
legal developments in important but unrecognized ways. Drawing on examples from 
global financial law, rules on capital mobility, and sovereign debt practices, I demonstrate 
how market principles can provide the real substantive content for conventionally 
recognized law, effectively counter official law, and act as powerful rules in the absence of 
clear legal standards. I further consider why “law” is a suitable categorization for these 
market principles, adopting a broad definition that derives from and pushes forward 
recent international legal scholarship. I contend that deliberately incorporating market 
principles into our understanding of the global legal order would be not only theoretically 
plausible but also productive, especially by expanding the field of legal work and activism 
and by raising important questions about lawmaking mechanisms, accountability, and 
norm coherence. I also suggest that market principles have thus far escaped attention 
from lawyers in part because of tendencies and assumptions in multiple variants of 
international legal scholarship itself. 
 
In highlighting how market principles play a role in the global legal order, I do not intend 
to grant them the legitimacy or presumptive obedience sometimes associated with the 
label “law.” Indeed, my motivation draws in part from a concern with the capacity of 
these market principles to effectively undermine policy options that may lead to better 
outcomes. My goal, instead, is to place them as squarely as possible at the center of legal 
analysis and critiqueand therefore to level the playing field between these market 
principles and other types of principles and values we may care about. 
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Introduction 
Standing in the background of the global legal order are a range of 
what might be called “market principles” or “market givens”collective 
presentations or beliefs about how markets work, which are treated as 
objective descriptions at a particular time and place. Some market 
principles recently dominant in the international arena include: “Sovereign 
states must pay debt to maintain access to capital markets”; “Imposing 
capital controls undermines investment and development”; and “Austerity 
measures promote growth.” Others can be found, explicitly or implicitly, 
in the pages of newspapers, economic textbooks, and policy documents. 
These market principles delineate permissible and impermissible 
behavior and entail associated rewards or punishments, thus forming part 
of the shared background for transnational economic relations. 
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This Article argues that such market givens should be understood as 
a kind of “law in hiding,” shaping the policy space available to states and 
other actors and affecting global legal developments in important but 
unrecognized ways. This does not at all mean they are unchanging 
anyone with a passing awareness of economic history (or, indeed, history 
in general) will know that one era’s certain knowledge is another’s 
outdated ideology. Still, at any given historical moment, a market principle 
that distills and presents ostensibly objective knowledge can prove quite 
powerful, as any government official can confirm. The fact that such givens 
do not have a clear rulemaker or lawmaker, unlike standards or rules of 
other sorts, does nothing to diminish their power or their directive capacity. 
Although “mere” norms or beliefs frequently garner less attention than 
other rule forms such as hard or soft law, these market principles may 
actually gain in potency because they escape the additional scrutiny 
associated with the labels “law,” “governance,” “standard,” or “rule.” 
Indeed, my motivation draws in part from a concern with the 
capacity of these market principles to effectively undermine policy 
options that may lead to better outcomes. This is paired with a sense that 
market principles seem to gain power from being seen as exogenous to 
international law and legal criticism, including criticism from the 
perspectives of human rights and governmental accountability. The goal 
of this Article, then, involves placing them as squarely as possible into 
the center of legal analysis and critiqueto level the playing field, in a 
way, between these market principles and other types of principles and 
values society may care about. This is not to suggest that they should 
automatically be accorded the legitimacy and presumptive obedience 
traditionally associated with law. Setting aside the thorny question of 
when even conventionally recognized law deserves such habitual 
acquiescence, these market principles have hardly gone through any 
process that would render them particularly deserving of respect. Rather, 
the goal is to highlight how such market givens nonetheless act like law, 
and to suggest that, given this reality, they should be investigated and 
criticized at least as intensively as law traditionally writ. 
So what do I mean by “market principles”? And what impact can 
they have in the international legal arena? Part I begins this Article by 
more fully defining my understanding of this concept and by highlighting 
how market principles in the global arena can generate the substantive 
content for law, provide its interpretive core, and shape its reputational 
compliance mechanisms. This Part first considers how market principles 
can work through more conventionally recognized hard or soft law, 
acting in ways that are often overlooked but that provide the real clout 
for the actual functioning of these rules.1 It then introduces the example 
 
 1. See infra Part I.A. 
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of the international law on capital controls, which demonstrates how 
market principles can counter official hard law, transmitting a rule that 
effectively undermines or obviates the ostensible law on the books.2 
Finally, Part I looks at the case of sovereign debt continuity to consider 
how a market principle can itself act as powerful but hidden law, guiding 
and blocking state action with significant distributional consequences.3 
These examples also emphasize two key elements of market principles 
that become important for thinking through the potential impact of 
greater legal scrutiny: First, like much of international law, they are 
enforced largely through a reputational sanction, which succeeds most 
when there is a high degree of ideological consensus around the market 
principle itself.4 Second, these examples also underscore that, although 
market principles may be stable for a time, they are not inevitable and 
are therefore necessarily prone to historical variation, thus inviting a 
closer look at the constellation of factors that enable change at any given 
moment. 
Still, even if we acknowledge the importance of market principles in 
shaping global governance outcomes, is it plausible to consider them part 
of the international legal order itself? Although the motivation for this 
Article derives in part from the possible consequences of this 
characterization, the analytical argument should also stand as a separate 
matter. Part II begins to consider why, at least in the global arena, “law” 
is a suitable categorization for these market principles, as opposed to 
something more neutral such as “constraint.” Scholars and practitioners 
have expanded the traditional boundaries of law in this field, such that it 
already exists on something of a flexible continuum.5 In light of this 
definitional approach, I contend that the expansion could go yet further, 
particularly given that market principles display many of the features 
that we associate with law.6 For example, as the capital controls and debt 
continuity examples suggest, ostensibly objective market givens may in fact 
be deeply contingent and largely manmadeone essential element 
distinguishing law from other regularities or constraints.7 Market principles 
themselves, even if they are assumed to be an objective element external 
 
 2. See infra Part I.B. 
 3. See infra Part I.C. 
 4. For a discussion of the importance of reputational sanctions in international law, see Andrew T. 
Guzman, How International Law Works: A Rational Choice Theory 33–48 (2008) (noting that 
reputational sanction is one key mechanism for the enforcement of international law, along with 
reciprocal noncompliance and retaliation); Rachel Brewster, Unpacking the State’s Reputation, 50 Harv. 
Int’l L.J. 231, 236–37 (2009). On the centrality of ideological consensus for reputation, see Beth A. 
Simmons & Zachary Elkins, The Globalization of Liberalization: Policy Diffusion in the International 
Political Economy, 98 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 171, 173 (2004). 
 5. See infra Part II.A. 
 6. See infra Part II.B (discussing some of the features associated with law). 
 7. See id. (including discussion of law as manmade). 
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to (and unmovable by) law at any particular time, should presumptively be 
understood as among the global rules that are shaped by actor decisions, 
governance structures, and broader legal ideologies in a mutually 
constitutive dynamic. Although these economic givens are sometimes 
loosely called “laws of the market,” part of my argument is that such 
references need to be thought through more seriously. 
Next, Part III considers the potential effect of more deliberately 
incorporating market principles into our understanding of the legal 
order, and suggests that calling them “law” is not only plausible but also 
productive. Taking these norms out of hiding and recognizing their 
importance in legal functioning would encourage several types of 
productive analysis. First, it would encourage lawyers to take more 
comprehensive stock of the rules that actually impact particular issues, 
and could therefore shift certain forms of legal work and activism.8 
Second, this kind of lawyerly attention could make a contribution to the 
empirical understanding of market principles, even beyond that likely to 
be generated in the social sciences.9 Third, we could productively apply 
certain normative questions and frameworks associated with law to 
market principles.10 For example, legal scholars have noted that efforts to 
determine what the rules areto identify, codify, and institutionalize 
rulestend to trigger a mechanism for assessment and change.11 This in 
turn raises a range of thorny questions: If a given market principle is already 
generating rules in the global legal order, who are its rulemakers? What 
does it even mean to ask about rulemakers in this context, and how do we 
raise corresponding questions about accountability? In addition, lawyers 
are more likely than other individuals to ask whether the rules generated 
by market principles cohere with other standards in the global legal 
system. If the rule embedded in a particular market principle conflicts 
with emerging international rules, such as peremptory norms of human 
rights, is this a problem? If so, how should it be resolved? Part III also 
suggests that such questioning might help to enable beneficial policy 
options that are otherwise blocked by market principles, in particular by 
undermining the ideological consensus that underpins the reputational 
enforcement of any market given.12 Finally, this Article acknowledges the 
 
 8. See infra Part III.A. 
 9. See infra Part III.B. 
 10. See infra Part III.C. 
 11. See, e.g., Andrei Marmor, Social Conventions: From Language to Law 50–51 (2009). Marmor 
distinguishes between encyclopedic and legislative codification and suggests that this triggering is 
associated with legislative codification, which seeks to determine authoritatively what the rules are. 
However, the disagreement about (or expansion of) the sources and boundaries for international law, 
discussed in Part II.A, make these types of distinctions less applicable. 
 12. See infra Part III.D. 
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risk of inadvertently legitimating market principles by calling them 
“law,” but suggests that this risk is unlikely to materialize in practice.13 
In light of their seeming importance and the recently expanded 
understandings of “law” in the global arena, Part IV asks why market 
principles have escaped serious scrutiny by international lawyers thus far. It 
suggests that one essential reason they have remained in hiding, so to speak, 
lies in the tendencies of international legal scholarship itself. Although the 
dynamic of market principles in the global legal order parallels the 
interaction of law and norms in other areas, I argue that this dynamic tends 
to contradict a key assumption in much of international law. In particular, 
multiple variants of international legal scholarship explicitly or implicitly 
assume that global rules are deliberately chosen as rules in some way, by 
either states or other agents. Some of this writing even posits the existence 
of a hierarchy in the importance or effectiveness of legal formsa 
continuum (in ascending order of importance) of norms, customs, soft law, 
and then hard law. This scholarship seems to suppose that advocates of 
any particular rule will want to move up this hierarchy in order to solidify 
the effectiveness of their preferred standard. Rational choice and even 
constructivist scholars, both of whom focus in different ways on how 
actors construct law, are apt to reinforce this privileging of chosen law, 
even if they embrace international legal pluralism and acknowledge the 
mutual constitution of norms, laws, and actors.14 Critical international 
legal scholars have considered how knowledge practices can shape the 
substance and contours of law, but tend to exhort scholars to look 
beyond law rather than to recognize the ways in which market principles 
already work or act as law and thus might be subject to more standard 
tools of legal analysis.15 
Although the arguments of this Article are grounded in international 
legal theory and in examples with transnational ramifications, nothing 
connects these claims exclusively to the global level. Scholars in 
international law and international relations have thought very explicitly 
about the multiple possible forms and effects of global rules in recent 
years, pressed on by bigger questions about what counts as “law” and 
whether it really can exist in the absence of sovereign power and action. 
This rich literature thus informs the questions and contentions of this 
Article. But beliefs about how markets workindeed, beliefs about the 
purportedly inevitable causal mechanisms of the social world more 
generallycan shape expectations and practice across all levels of legal 
interaction; this phenomenon is hardly unique to transnational economic 
law. Norms and collective beliefs about ostensibly objective facts are present 
 
 13. See infra Part III.E. 
 14. See infra Part IV.A (discussing rational choice approaches); see infra Part IV.B (discussing 
constructivist approaches). 
 15. See infra Part IV.C. 
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in every facet of social life, including not only economic functioning but also 
informal strictures related to gender, race, and other areas. Indeed, this key 
insight underpins many studies of the extent to which legal practice is 
embedded in broader social structures. But the ways in which this 
particular subcategory of market norms functions within international 
economic law is understudied, and this lack of attention seems puzzling 
and problematic given its actual importance. In a way, the goal here is to 
argue, with a degree of nuance and specificity appropriate to the subject 
matter, in favor of an insight relatively easily accepted in other arenas of 
legal actionnamely, that the law on the books and the law in practice may 
be fundamentally distinct. Acknowledging the law in practice, including how 
market principles are part of this practice, is essential to a full understanding 
of the global legal order. 
I.  Market Principles in the Law 
So how do I define market principles and where do they fit into the 
global legal order? Although scholarship on contemporary international law 
has become capacious in its scope, certain elements have still tended to be 
understood as exogenous to the legal arena. Among these elements are what 
I call market principles or market givenscollective beliefs about how 
markets work as an objective matter. These are not self-consciously 
politically or morally directed beliefs about appropriate market action (such 
as “it is wrong to sell humans into slavery” or “markets should be designed 
to alleviate poverty”).16 Rather, market principles as defined here are 
those underlying understandings about market functioning that people 
often take to be grounded not in political or moral principle but rather in 
ostensibly objectively determined facts about the world. An example 
might be the contention that inflation results from soft central bankers, 
or that the imposition of capital controls will lead to slower growth 
relative to an accepted baseline.17 Of course, these principles may still be 
politically and morally inflected, and they may have important political 
and moral ramifications. However, that is not how they are presented 
and initially understood.18 Indeed, the very effectiveness of these beliefs 
can draw in part from the fact that they are not taken to be based on 
politics, morality, or law.19 Instead, these causal ideas arelike principles 
 
 16. Such explicit morally or politically derived norms certainly play a crucial role in shaping 
international law and have also played an important role in international legal theory, as discussed later in 
the Article. See, e.g., infra Part IV.B. 
 17. These examples are provided by Jonathan Kirshner, though in a different theoretical framework. 
See Monetary Orders: Ambiguous Economics, Ubiquitous Politics 4–12 (Jonathan Kirshner ed., 2003). 
 18. Kirshner’s edited volume focusing on monetary politics provides several examples or case studies of 
how economic statements are not presented as (or taken to be) political and changeable. See generally id. 
 19. Kirshner notes that “[f]undamentally political struggles about money are routinely cloaked in 
economic terms, often throwing students of politics off the scent.” Id. at 3–4. 
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of the natural sciencesimplicitly understood to be external to and 
unchangeable by legal mechanisms. They are “givens” or “truths,” more 
like the majestic law of gravity than the prosaic law of traffic lights. Of 
course, what counts as a “given” inevitably shifts over timesupposedly 
objective knowledge changes regularly in both the natural and social 
sciences. But a closer interrogation of these “matters of fact” is left to 
other disciplines and, although these facts may become part of the 
external background for international economic law, they are not 
scrutinized as part of the legal order itself.20 
This Part lays the groundwork for the argument that market 
principles are in fact very much part of the global legal order, broadly 
understood, and contends that they should be studied as such. Market 
givens can generate the substantive content for hard or soft law, shape the 
interpretation of such law, and also construct (or stiffen) its compliance 
mechanisms. As the example of capital controls demonstrates, they can 
actually displace the formal law officially on the books, effectively 
transmitting a contrary rule.21 Even in the absence of any obvious directive, 
as in the case of sovereign debt continuity, market principles may 
constitute law-like rules themselves, constraining state behavior and 
undermining efforts to develop alternative doctrines.22 
Each of these examples highlights a key feature that market 
principles share with many other forms of international lawnamely, that 
they are enforced largely through a reputational sanction.23 This points to 
the importance of relative consensus in maintaining the strength of a 
market principle, and also to the potential for weakening or undermining a 
market principle by breaking down that ideological accord. As Beth 
Simmons and Zachary Elkins have noted, ideological consensus “alters 
the reputational payoffs associated with policy choice.”24 The capital 
controls and sovereign debt continuity examples in particular also 
highlight another important feature of market principles, namely, their 
contingency and potential changeability.25 Although rules and 
regularities of all sorts inevitably constrain and condition actor 
behaviorwhile not being law-like themselvesthis manmade element 
of market principles helps bring them into the conceptual orbit of law as 
opposed to that of other regularities identifiable in the world. 
 
 20. Part III.B discusses how the development and falsification of market principles interacts with 
theories and models in the social science disciplines, and also suggests that introducing a more lawyerly 
mindset might be productive in this empirical arena as well. 
 21. See infra Part I.B. 
 22. See infra Part I.C. 
 23. See, e.g., Guzman, supra note 4, at 33; Brewster, supra note 4, at 236. 
 24. Simmons & Elkins, supra note 4, at 173. The role of ideological consensus is discussed in further 
detail later in this Part.  
 25. See infra Part I.B; infra Part I.C (highlighting the element of changeability).  
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A. At Work in Conventional Law 
Scholars of law and politics have highlighted that states and other 
actors can choose from multiple mechanisms in constructing the rules of 
global governancefrom formal hard law such as binding treaties to soft 
law mechanisms including guidelines and codes of conduct, which may 
generate less controversy due to their relative flexibility, imprecision, or 
nonbinding nature.26 Among the many issues implicated by this literature 
are the questions of how actors select and interpret the content for these 
rules and also how these rules are actually enforced.27 One way in which 
market principles are part of the global legal order is by working through 
this type of more conventionally recognized global lawby generating 
the substantive content for international rules, shaping the interpretation 
of such rules, and providing the bite for their compliance mechanisms. 
As such, they can play a dispositive role in determining legal outcomes 
without, paradoxically, being identified as a key component of the legal 
order itself. 
One central goal of the institutions and laws of global governance is 
to coordinate state action around a set of rules that ideally constitutes an 
improvement for all.28 But where does the substance of these standards 
come from? From an institutional design perspective, a key way that 
market principles may shape law is by providing focal points for this type 
of rulemaking.29 Certainly, one actor or another, calculating to promote 
their own interest and their own vision of the public good, may propose 
correspondingly self-serving rules or standards. But these actors’ 
proposals can also instantiate a set of beliefs about how markets work as 
an objective matter, and seek to ensure that markets function efficiently 
and smoothly, in a way that would serve not only the proposals’ sponsors 
but also others in the broader global system. 
 
 26. See, e.g., Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International Governance, 
54 Int’l Org. 421, 421 (2000); Andrew T. Guzman & Timothy L. Meyer, International Soft Law, 2 J. Legal 
Analysis 171, 172 (2010); Charles Lipson, Why Are Some International Agreements Informal?, 45 Int’l 
Org. 495, 500 (1991); Kal Raustiala, The Architecture of International Cooperation: Transgovernmental 
Networks and the Future of International Law, 43 Va. J. Int’l L. 1, 2–3 (2002). 
 27. See generally sources cited supra note 26; Guzman, supra note 4. The literature on rational 
institutions also provides insight into these issues. For a foundational volume, see generally Barbara 
Koremenos et al., The Rational Design of International Institutions, 55 Int’l Org. 761 (2001). 
 28. Although there is no universally agreed upon definition of global governance, the report by 
the independent Commission on Global Governance in 1995 defined it as “the sum of the many ways 
individuals and institutions, public and private, manage their common affairs. It is a continuing process 
through which conflicting or diverse interests may be accommodated and cooperative action may be 
taken.” Margaret P. Karns & Karen A. Mingst, International Organizations: The Politics and 
Processes of Global Governance 3–4 (2d ed. 2010). 
 29. This resonates with the broader literature on how ideas can serve as focal points for coordination, 
policy, and rulemaking. For an early example, see Geoffrey Garrett & Barry R. Weingast, Ideas, Interests, 
and Institutions: Constructing the European Community’s Internal Market, in Ideas and Foreign Policy: 
Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change 173–206 (Judith Goldstein & Robert O. Keohane eds., 1993). 
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This foundational role of market beliefs can exist at a very deep 
background level, as with the complex set of global trade rules and 
institutions built on the market principles of free trade and comparative 
advantage. Such beliefs about market functioning not only have grounded 
and justified the initial founding of institutions and conventions such as the 
World Trade Organization and Bilateral Investment Treaties, but also 
continue to shape how these regimes’ rules are used and interpreted.30 This 
impact can also exist at the level of actors selecting more fine-grained and 
modest guidelines and codes of conduct. For example, speaking of soft 
financial institutions, Chris Brummer points out that certain global 
governance rules may:  
[A]rticulate norms that have not previously been systematized. What are, 
in fact, preferred practices have not been explicitly identified as such but 
are simply matters of habit or widely followed practice that are implicit 
and taken for granted. Once regulators identify and express best 
practices . . . those practices become explicit and prescriptive.31  
Thus market principles can play an essential role in quietly shaping best 
practices and expectations, which may eventually be codified (and 
possibly strengthened) through more conventional legal forms. 
For example, the Group of 20 (“G-20”) finance ministers and central 
bank governors regularly issue pronouncements that implicate or adopt 
particular beliefs about economic functioning; these declarations 
sometimes explicitly seek to identify the (ideally) objective determinants 
of particular economic outcomes around which further policy might be 
formulated. The G-20’s September 2013 Leaders’ Declaration, for 
example, noted the endorsement of a work plan to help “assess factors 
affecting the availability and accessibility of long-term financing for 
investment and committed to identify and start to implement a set of 
collective and country-specific measures that tangibly improve our 
domestic investment environments [sic].”32 While the ultimate policy 
 
 30. For example, the foundational texts of the global trade regime make exceptions for developing 
countries, as a carve out from their general commitment to free trade and comparative advantage. However, 
particularly in the earlier decades of the trade regime, these exceptions tended to be read narrowly. See, 
e.g., Michael J. Trebilcock & Robert Howse, The Regulation of International Trade 324 (1995). It is 
possible that World Trade Organization (“WTO”) adjudicative bodies are now attempting to make room for 
greater exceptions on the basis of moral issues, as suggested by the recent EC-Seals decision of the WTO 
Appellate Body (though this moral exception approach was criticized by some developing countries). For 
more on the import of EC-Seals, see, for example, Gregory Shaffer & David Pabian, European 
CommunitiesMeasures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of Seal Products, 109 Am. J. Int’l L. 154, 
154–61 (2015). For a critical take on the main institutions of global governance and the argument that these 
institutions and their associated rules (and presumably associated market principles) constitute a nascent 
imperial global state serving the interests of a transnational capitalist class, see B. S. Chimni, International 
Institutions Today: An Imperial Global State in the Making, 15 Eur. J. Int’l L. 1, 1 (2004). 
 31. Chris Brummer, Soft Law and the Global Financial System: Rule Making in the 21st 
Century 151 (2d ed. 2015). 
 32. Russia G-20, G-20 Leaders’ Declaration 3–4 (2013). 
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recommendations, which become the focal point for international 
coordination, are more readily identified as global law, much of the work 
of that “law” is actually done by the beliefs about how investment markets 
work, as determined and formulated by the study group called for in the 
declaration. The post-2008 crisis Financial Stability Board exhibits a 
similar dynamic, also issuing reports about the determinants of market 
success or failure along with related recommendations and standards 
designed to strengthen global finance.33 Thus, market beliefs about the 
efficacy or harm of particular actions can remain prior to, and in fact may 
affect the selection and success of, the subsequent officialized rule. 
In addition to this background content-generating function, market 
principles can also play an important role in reputational enforcement 
within the global legal order. Concern about reputation, defined as the 
beliefs about an actor’s likely future actions based on that actor’s past 
actionsis frequently presented as one reason states choose to comply 
with international agreements even when it might be in their interest to 
violate their provisions.34 While it is possible for reputational effects to be 
entirely internal (that is, relevant only among the parties to the actual 
agreement in question), a state’s actions may also affect its reputation in 
the eyes of a broader range of actors, possibly up to the international 
community writ large.35 Indeed, one of the key enforcement mechanisms 
for a range of legal agreements, particularly but not only those in global 
finance, is understood to involve the expected reaction of capital markets 
and broader audiences to a given state action, based on market actors’ 
likely beliefs about the appropriateness of that action under the 
circumstances.36 The capital controls and sovereign debt continuity 
examples below highlight the centrality of this reputational mechanism 
for market principles. 
Of course, the more specific interrelations of reputational effect, 
background market givens, and identifiable financial regulations can be 
 
 33. The Financial Stability Board continued the actions of its predecessor, the Financial Stability 
Forum, on this front. Its reports, including published standards and country peer reviews, are made 
available on its website. See Publications, Fin. Stability Board, http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/ 
publications/ (last visited Mar. 11, 2017). 
 34. For important studies of reputation in political science, see Beth A. Simmons, International 
Law and State Behavior: Commitment and Compliance in International Monetary Affairs, 94 Am. Pol. 
Sci. Rev. 819 (2000); Michael Tomz, Reputation and International Cooperation: Sovereign Debt 
Across Three Centuries (2007); Jonathan Mercer, Reputation & International Politics (1996). 
 35. See, e.g., Guzman, supra note 4, at 33–48; Oona A. Hathaway, Between Power and Principle: An 
Integrated Theory of International Law, 72 U. Chi. L. Rev. 469, 506–07 (2005); Brewster, supra note 4; see 
also Odette Lienau, Rethinking Sovereign Debt: Politics, Reputation, and Legitimacy in Modern 
Finance 26–28 (2014). 
 36. Brummer, focusing primarily on the reputation of regulators among their peers, similarly notes 
that “international financial regulation, though formally a species of ‘soft law,’ is bolstered by various 
disciplining mechanisms that render it, under certain circumstances, more coercive than traditional 
theories of international law predict.” Brummer, supra note 31, at 120. 
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hard to tease out. Brummer suggests that “international financial law can 
help shape the perceptions of investors, lenders, and other relevant 
market participants as to the value of any particular kind of conduct,”37 
which might in turn impact reputational consequences. But to what 
degree are these new regulations always shaping market participants’ 
own understandings of economic cause and effect? Or, in other words, 
do these rules really result in investors buying into a previously 
unaccepted set of ideasfor example, that heightened bank capital 
requirements will stabilize a domestic financial system and thus justify a 
lower cost of capital for firms in that jurisdiction?  
The alternative is also possible and at least equally likelynamely, 
that crucial work is being done by a prior set of market beliefs. Jonathan 
Kirshner has pointed out that a unique feature of monetary politicsand 
perhaps by extension a range of financial issuesis its distinctive 
relationship to ideas, given that money has no inherent content or value. 
Thus, its distinguishing attributes include “the unique link between ideas 
and ‘market sentiment’ . . . and the overwhelming influence of that 
sentiment on the ability to practice macroeconomic policy.”38 Kirshner 
suggests that the policy most likely to be successful or credible is that 
“which ‘the market’ thinks is right. Policies that are not credible cannot 
be sustained because of the responses of market actors to such policies.”39 
Although here Kirshner refers most directly to domestic policy choices 
and policy autonomy, there is good reason to expect that this market 
sentiment dynamic would extend to the viability of transgovernmental 
rulemaking as well. 
In short, certain beliefs and principlesgrounded in assessments about 
market functioning and resulting in expectations about appropriate 
actionare likely to affect not only the initial selection behavior of 
rulemakers but also the subsequent compliance decisions of actors subject to 
the resulting rules. To the extent that credibility or reputation play a role in 
enforcing particular legal rules and the policy choices that they enact, 
market principlesincluding beliefs about how particular economic actions 
will impact market position or market functioningmay themselves delimit 
the workable parameters of law more conventionally understood. Relatedly, 
if a preferred law violates underlying market principlesand if it is unable 
to help shift key beliefs over timeit is unlikely to be successful and so may 
fall by the wayside, even if it is instantiated in an officially adopted legal rule. 
So there is good reason to consider the possibility that the crucial 
enforcement mechanism of reputation in some international law derives 
force not so much from carefully formalized rules (though certainly those 
 
 37. Id. at 150. 
 38. Jonathan Kirshner, The Inescapable Politics of Money, in Monetary Orders: Ambiguous 
Economics, Ubiquitous Politics, supra note 17, at 13. 
 39. Id. 
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are still helpful and clarifying) but instead from unchosen and even 
unacknowledged background beliefs about ostensibly objective market 
facts. 
As a result, these market principles can have surprisingly certain effects 
within particular issue areas. They can be incorporated into other more 
conventionally understood legal work, producing the substantive content for 
law and shaping the important compliance mechanism of reputation. And 
the violation of these principles can have real consequences for the actors 
involved, despite the lack of legal attention paid to them. Indeed, it may well 
be the case that the work or effect attributed to more recognizable legal 
rules is actually being done by these hidden market principles. 
B. The Counter-Law of Capital Mobility 
While market principles may act by generating the content and 
supporting the compliance mechanisms for conventionally recognized 
law, such embedding and formalization is not necessary for their legal or 
law-like work. As the example of capital controls demonstrates, market 
principles can actually displace the formal law officially on the books, 
effectively transmitting a contrary rule. Indeed, for capital controls, 
studying the hard law in order to understand the rules on the ground 
would result in hapless confusion. Although the official law grants states 
significant policy space to impose capital controls as they see fit, this 
formal rule has at times been entirely contravened by a market 
principleaccepted and promoted by key International Monetary Fund 
(“IMF”) staffthat effectively mandated open capital accounts. 
Cross-border capital flowswhich are the streams of money into and 
out of a country that link it to the global economyhave been a significant 
topic of discussion and a target of potential regulation in international 
economic relations.40 From a recipient country’s perspective, such cross-
border capital can provide much needed funding for the local economy 
at more reasonable interest rates than are available domestically, 
whether for public investment, private business growth, or increased 
household consumption.41 And, from a sending country’s perspective, 
allowing domestic capital to flow overseas may result in higher rates of 
return on investment.42 That said, there is certainly no guarantee that 
cross-border funds will move where they are most productively 
employed as opposed to moving toward the faddish investment of the 
moment.43 A surplus of funds can also facilitate asset bubbles, where the 
price of certain assets may become unreasonably and unstably high (real 
 
 40. Adam Feibelman calls them “the connective tissue of the international financial system.” Adam 
Feibelman, The IMF and Regulation of Cross-Border Capital Flows, 15 Chi. J. Int’l L. 409, 411 (2015). 
 41. See, e.g., id. at 411–12. 
 42. See, e.g., id. 
 43. See, e.g., id. 
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estate and tech startups are recent examples). It may also fuel inflation, 
pushing the supply of money beyond what is needed for the goods 
available for purchase. It can even impact the exchange rate: When 
significant foreign funds move in and need to be converted into local 
currency, the value of local currency can increase relative to foreign 
currencies, thus making the country’s export commodities more costly on 
international markets and potentially dampening a country’s export 
sectors.44 And all of this works in reverse as wellthe rapid outflow of 
capital can factor in drying up much needed funds, compromising a 
domestic banking sector, tanking a local currency, and making essential 
imports too costly.45 
Unsurprisingly, given both the potential and the problems inherent in 
global capital flows, sovereign governments have frequently sought to 
regulate the movement of capital into and out of their domestic economies.46 
The measures for achieving this goalcapital controlsmay apply generally 
or may target specific sectors and can include taxes and tariffs on inflows or 
outflows, volume restrictions, and other mechanisms.47 There has been some 
empirical disagreement about the basic desirability of unregulated capital 
inflows and outflows, and also about the actual efficacy of any regulations 
that might be put in place to dampen them.48 Nonetheless, a number of 
sovereign states have continued to see the value in such controls, or at 
least in retaining the policy space to access these measures when needed.49 
How have sovereign attempts to manage such flows been treated by 
the relevant global rules? Certain subgroups of statesin particular the 
developed state members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (“OECD”) and the European Unionhave agreed to 
mandate capital account liberalization, for example through the OECD 
Code of Liberalisation of Capital Movements.50 However, the most 
 
 44. These and other problems are especially associated with “hot money,” and there is some concern 
that the group mentality frequently at work in finance can exacerbate these dynamics. For a brief policy-
oriented overview of the pros and cons of liberalizing capital accounts, see M. Ayhan Kose & Eswar 
Prasad, Capital Accounts: Liberalize or Not?, Int’l Monetary Fund, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ 
ft/fandd/basics/capital.htm (last visited Mar. 11, 2017). 
 45. See id. 
 46. See Capital Controls and Capital Flows in Emerging Economies: Policies, Practices, and 
Consequences (Sebastian Edwards ed., 2007); see also Andrés Fernández et al., Capital Control Measures: A 
New Dataset (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 15/80, 2015) (presenting a new dataset of capital 
controls from 1995 to 2013). 
 47. See Olivier Jeanne et al., Who Needs to Open the Capital Account? 4–5 (2012); Hal S. Scott & 
Anna Gelpern, International Finance: Transactions, Policy, and Regulation 1274–79 (19th ed. 2012). 
 48. See Kevin Gallagher, Regaining Control? Capital Controls and the Global Financial Crisis 8–9 
(Political Econ. Research Inst., Working Paper No. 250, 2011); see also Scott & Gelpern, supra note 47, 
at 1274–79; Feibelman, supra note 40, at 422 n.67. 
 49. See all sources cited supra note 48. 
 50. Org. for Econ. Co-Operation & Dev., OECD Code of Liberalisation of Capital Movements 
(2016). See Stephany Griffith-Jones et al., United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 
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broadly applicable formal international law relevant to capital controlsthe 
IMF Articles of Agreement, pertinent to the institution’s 188 member 
states51clearly supports the right of governments to employ such measures. 
Article VI very explicitly notes that states are permitted to “exercise such 
controls as are necessary to regulate international capital movements.”52 A 
carve out does exist for current transactionspayments for traded goods 
and services, interest, remittances, and the likeproviding that “no member 
shall, without the approval of the Fund, impose restrictions on the making of 
payments and transfers for the current international transactions.”53 But this 
current account liberalization provision still leaves a significant amount of 
leeway for a government actor to impose controls in an effort to manage the 
sizable inflows and outflows of other forms of capital. 
This openness in the written law makes sense given that the designers 
of the modern international financial system were hardly sanguine about 
unrestricted cross-border capital flows. As Annamaria Viterbo points out, 
these key architects in the waning years of World War II “did not consider 
capital account convertibility either necessary or desirable.”54 In 1956, the 
IMF executive board reiterated that: “Members are free to adopt a policy 
of regulating capital movements for any reason . . . without approval of the 
Fund.”55 A 1978 amendment to Article IV of the Fund’s Articles, which 
had legalized floating exchange rates following the end of the Bretton 
Woods era gold-dollar system, did allow the Fund to “exercise firm 
surveillance over the exchange rate policies of members.”56 But this 
amendment did not reach the issue of capital liberalization, and the 
process failed to provide even a less ambitious code of conduct, despite 
preliminary efforts in this direction.57 
 
Management of Capital Flows: Comparative Experience and Implications for Africa Part 2, U.N. Doc. 
UNCTAD/GDS/MDPB/2003/1 (Apr. 2003) (providing an overview of the experience for OECD countries). 
 51. IMF Members’ Quotas and Voting Power, and IMF Board of Governors, Int’l Monetary Fund 
(last updated Jan. 17, 2017), https://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/memdir/members.aspx. 
 52. Articles of Agreement of the IMF, Art. VI, § 3. 
 53. Id. Art. VIII, § 2(a). The Articles define current account transactions as “payments which are not 
for the purpose of transferring capital,” including payments associated with trade, services, short-term 
banking and credit extensions, loan interest payments, investment income, moderate payments for loan 
amortization or investment depreciations, and moderate family remittances. Id. Art. XXX(d). Of course, 
this definition itself is complex and leaves some gray areas, and so the IMF Balance of Payments Manual, 
updated periodically, makes an effort to update definitions and standardize usage of these terms.  
 54. Annamaria Viterbo, International Economic Law and Monetary Measures: Limitations to 
States’ Sovereignty and Dispute Settlement 179 (Alan O. Sykes et al. eds., 2012). 
 55. Rawi Abdelal, Capital Rules: The Construction of Global Finance 132 (2007); see also 
Jeffrey M. Chwieroth, Capital Ideas: The IMF and the Rise of Financial Liberalization (2010). 
 56. Articles of Agreement of the IMF, Art. IV. The precise meaning of “firm surveillance” would of 
course eventually have to be worked out through staff policies. For an overview of the legal framework of 
Article IV, see Int’l Monetary Fund Legal Dep’t, Article IV of the Fund’s Articles of Agreement: 
An Overview of the Legal Framework 3 (June 2006). 
 57. See Abdelal, supra note 55, at 133–35. 
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Still, the uniformity, state policy leeway, and stability suggested by the 
formal international law has not been matched on the ground, particularly 
because later generations of key IMF policymakers did not share the 
original concern with unfettered capital liberalization reflected in the 
written rule. As such, the actual unwritten rule has shifted significantly 
since 1945, at moments resulting in a real constraint on a state’s ability to 
impose capital controls.58 In particular, the collective beliefs about the 
market impact and advisability of capital controls changed, especially in 
the late 1980s and through the mid-1990s.59 During this period, and 
despite the absence of a clear legal basis, the IMF began to encourage 
liberalization by its member states.60 As a former IMF executive director 
noted, “[c]apital account liberalization had become an accepted part of 
our orthodoxy. It had for some time been Fund policy to promote capital 
account liberalization.”61  
The Fund did not aggressively press for the elimination of capital 
controls in every instance, and differences emerged between various 
groups within the Fund, including between departments in charge of 
differing regions or areas.62 However, an official IMF report from 1997 
did formally acknowledge that, although the Articles only mentioned an 
obligation to liberalize current accounts, “the Fund has in recent years 
sought to promote capital account liberalization.”63 The IMF also noted 
that such advocacy proceeded apace “in view of the benefits that can 
accrue from capital movements and their importance in the international 
monetary system.”64 In other words, the perceived market principlethe 
collective beliefs about market functioninghad changed, particularly 
within the IMF staff. Some within the IMF even lobbied for an 
amendment to the Articles of Agreement to further enshrine the new 
market principle on the topic and place capital account liberalization 
formally in the IMF bailiwick. This effort was eventually led publicly by 
IMF Managing Director Michel Camdessus, whose 1997 speech 
exhorting the board to adopt the amendment argued that countries 
 
 58. See Feibelman, supra note 40. 
 59. See Abdelal, supra note 55; see also Chwieroth, supra note 55. 
 60. The IMF was subsequently criticized severely for this advice, along with other policy 
recommendations that came to be known. See, e.g., Paul Blustein, The Chastening: Inside the Crisis 
That Rocked the Global Financial System and Humbled the IMF 10 (2003) (noting that the IMF’s 
credibility was damaged by the financial crises of the late 1990s, and also that the IMF itself spearheaded the 
movement to liberalize global capital). 
 61. Abdelal, supra note 55, at 128–29. 
 62. See generally Chwieroth, supra note 55 (providing a detailed look at the differences of opinion 
across factions of the IMF staff, in particular the differences between those who advocated a more 
gradualist and carefully sequenced approach to capital liberalization and those who pressed for a “big 
bang” approach that argued in favor of full liberalization as a “first-best” policy). 
 63. Abdelal, supra note 55, at 137. 
 64. Id. 
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cannot “compete for the blessings of global capital markets and refuse 
their disciplines.”65 
What accounts for this shift? Although much has been said about 
the Wall Street-Treasury-IFI complex, implying that perhaps IMF 
actions are coordinated to promote the interests of the U.S. government 
or private financial actors, the evidence suggests otherwise.66 Indeed, 
scholars highlight that the U.S. Treasury was lukewarm at best in regard to 
the amendmentcertainly not in the driver’s seatand that the Treasury 
and the U.S. Executive Director of the IMF fell entirely silent on the issue 
of the amendment upon signs of disapproval from Congress.67 And while 
private financial actors generally supported capital liberalization, they 
tended to remain suspicious of any policy shift that could concentrate 
additional power outside of Wall Street, and were especially distressed 
that they had not been consulted as part of the process.68 
Although the effort to amend the Articles ultimately failed, it would 
hardly be accurate to say that this was due to any particular strength of 
the hard law rule allowing capital controls. The Fund had by then 
effectively adopted an informal soft law rule in favor of liberalization, 
though its staff did not necessarily recommend liberalization 
indiscriminately.69 Interestingly, the former IMF Director of Research, 
subsequently serving as the Dutch Executive Director, opposed the 
amendment by highlighting that the Fund had already “wholeheartedly 
embraced capital liberalization . . . without being hindered by a lack of 
mandate.”70 His opposition rested primarily with the concern that, if 
given a legal mandate, Fund staff would feel pressured to insist strictly on 
liberalization, “making sure at each step that any policy it recommends 
or endorses can pass the test of the new Article.”71 Others agreed that the 
lack of a legal mandate did not act as a deterrent or a hindrance to the 
new rule. Former U.S. Treasury Secretary Larry Summers admitted that 
“[b]y the 1990s . . . no one thought that the Fund was at all faithful to its 
charter. . . . The goals they had outlined . . . were anachronistic.”72 Indeed, 
Jeffrey Chwieroth highlights that “the initiative to amend the Articles in 
 
 65. Id. at 155 (emphasizing the centrality of European IMF officials in these efforts). But cf. 
Chwieroth, supra note 55, at 156 (emphasizing that internal shift in beliefs happened firstthat “the 
staff had changed their normative outlook in the 1980s prior to any active management involvement 
on the issue.”). 
 66. See Jagdish Bhagwati, The Capital Myth: The Difference Between Trade in Widgets and Dollars, 
77 Foreign Aff. 7, 7 (1998) (explaining the general idea of a Wall Street-Treasury-IFI complex as a theme in 
some commentary is traceable to Jagdish Bhagwati’s coining of the Wall-Street Treasury Complex). 
 67. Abdelal, supra note 55, at 141, 157–58; Chwieroth, supra note 55, at 157–58. 
 68. Abdelal, supra note 55, at 139, 141–42, 153–54; see Chwieroth, supra note 55, at 159. 
 69. Abdelal, supra note 55, at 138. 
 70. Id. at 157. 
 71. Id.  
 72. Id. at 136. 
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the late 1990s was in large part an exercise in empowering the staff with 
more tools to encourage a policy that many of them had already been 
promoting informally for nearly a decade.”73 Thus, the amendment was not 
really necessary to the goal of clarifying a rule that disfavored capital 
controls. In effect, the shift in beliefs within the IMF already constituted 
something akin to an unwritten code of conduct in favor of liberalization. 
This is not to say that the successful amendment of the Articles would 
have made no differencerecognition of the importance of market 
principles hardly entails a rejection of other rule forms as irrelevant. Nor 
does it involve an insistence that market givens will gain primacy in every 
instance. Successful formalization in the late 1990s could well have 
emboldened those in the IMF who advocated for capital liberalization. It 
also could have hardened efforts to promote more absolutist, shock-
therapy style modes of liberalization even after the financial crises of 
1997 and 1998 or the 2008 financial crisis, which dampened the most 
zealous efforts to promote liberalization in emerging economies.74  
But it is also worth asking whether the Article amendment project 
actually ended up helping to undermine the market principle itself. The 
efforts to formalize what had been a fairly successful informal background 
rule did draw the attention and the ire of key playersnotably the U.S. 
Congresswho vocally rejected the effort.75 And the Fund’s seeming 
hubris of asking for additional power to liberalize capital in the face of the 
1997–1998 financial crisis, which some critics believed had been 
exacerbated by speculative flows enabled by the dismantling of controls, 
opened the IMF up to a significant degree of criticism.76 It also drew the 
attention of scholars of economics and international politics, whose 
additional scrutiny may have helped to erode the dominance of any 
ideological consensus in favor of liberalization that previously existed.77 Of 
course, any independent impact from the spotlight and discussion 
generated by the amendment effort is difficult to tease out, especially 
because the serious launch of the processrecommending the amendment 
to the IMF Board of Governors at the end of 1997coincided with the 
deepening of the Asian crisis as it spread from Southeast Asia to South 
 
 73. Chwieroth, supra note 55, at 9. 
 74. See Blustein, supra note 60, at 10; Abdelal, supra note 55, at 159 (noting that the start of the 
Russian crisis in August 1998 constituted “the final nail in the coffin of the capital account amendment”). 
For a brief discussion of the more measured approach to liberalization taken after the 2008 crisis, see infra 
sources cited at notes 87–89 and accompanying text. 
 75. Abdelal, supra note 55, at 141, 157–58; Chwieroth, supra note 55, at 157–58. 
 76. See Blustein, supra note 60, at 10; Abdelal, supra note 55, at 159. 
 77. Among the most vocal scholars and critics has been Joseph Stiglitz, former Chief Economist of 
the World Bank. See generally Joseph E. Stiglitz, Capital-Market Liberalization, Globalization, and the 
IMF, 20 Oxford Rev. Econ. Pol’y 57, 71 (2004). 
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Korea.78 As such, it is likely (one hopes) that the larger global crisis would 
have focused attention on the possible risks of capital liberalization in any 
case. 
Through all this, it is important to keep in mind that countries were of 
course free to reject these background mandates, as is the case with any hard 
or soft law as well. And IMF staff members insisted that capital 
liberalization ultimately remained a state decision. Certainly, the powerful 
lever of conditional lending, which has been employed (controversially) to 
support IMF-preferred policies in other areasthough, again, always with 
the voluntary acquiescence of statesremained off-limits in staff efforts to 
persuade countries to liberalize their capital accounts, given that capital 
liberalization was not one of the official goals stated in the Fund’s Articles. 
Still, in April 1997, certain executive board members requested an opinion 
from the Fund’s General Counsel, François Gianviti, on the legal status of 
this less formal advocacy. According to the board minutes, he responded 
that he found it: 
[D]ifficult to confirm that promotion of capital account liberalization fell 
within the Fund’s mandate, . . . . The Fund was not promoting 
liberalization of capital investments or capital transactions as such; the 
Fund had been assisting members in achieving that purpose, as their 
purpose and objective, not as a purpose of the Fund itself. In fact, it would 
be contrary to the right of members under Article VI to restrict capital 
transactions. The Fund could perhaps persuade, convince, or explain the 
benefits, but that was something else . . . . That did not mean that the Fund 
had the power to impose additional obligations and, in particular, the 
obligation to liberalize capital movements. What the Fund could do at the 
present stage was to tell a member that there was an undesirable state of 
affairs, and to change, but that was not an obligation.79 
Thus Gianviti carefully distinguished between problematic 
“promotion” and permissible persuading, convincing, and explaining of 
benefits.80 Of course, this dividing line is far from perfectly clear, and 
different actors may well interpret any given episode of promoting versus 
persuading differently. From the perspective of some countries in the 
international economic system, being “told to change” by the Fund can feel 
very much like an obligationperhaps even more so than other legal or 
semi-legal obligations generated by more formal hard or soft law 
instruments.81 
 
 78. See Blustein, supra note 60, at 1–10 (detailing the spread of the Asian Financial Crisis into South 
Korea and the IMF efforts in the South Korean crisis). 
 79. Abdelal, supra note 55, at 150 (quoting François Gianviti, IMF General Counsel). 
 80. Id. 
 81. See Ngaire Woods, The Globalizers: The IMF, the World Bank, and Their Borrowers 65–83 
(2006). This persuasive power relies at least in part on the existence of willing interlocutors in IMF member 
countries. Still, this persuasion has been quite effective. The IMF and the World Bank have succeeded in 
their globalization efforts “by requiring governments to open up to global trade, investment, and capital.” Id. 
at 3. 
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Part of the mechanism for the influence of a market principle involves 
its broader reputational enforcement, particularly once key actors, 
including international economic institutions like the IMF, identify it as 
economic orthodoxy.82 As mentioned in the previous Subpart, which 
discussed how market principles can act in conventional law, hard or soft 
law rules might actually work through the initial selection and subsequent 
reputational enforcement of a background market principle. This 
reputational enforcement can also help to buttress the rule generated by a 
market principle more directly, without further formalization in a hard or 
soft law format. While it is an oversimplification to think of capital markets 
or creditors as a single, uniformly responding entity, in some historical and 
institutional contexts it may in fact be the case that market actors and even 
the broader audiences for state actions seem to speak with a more unified 
voice.83 The existence of such an ideological consensus “alters the 
reputational payoffs associated with policy choice.”84 In particular, a 
state’s decision to act in a manner that counters the apparent consensus 
is seen not as a reasonable selection of one among multiple plausible 
policy options, but rather more like the violation of an accepted rulean 
alarming signal of recalcitrance or heterodoxyand thus deserving of 
greater reputational sanction in response. 
This reaction may happen through investors alone, but can also be 
magnified or exacerbated with the introduction of institutions such as 
credit rating agencies, which have played an essential role in judging 
sovereign financial policy and decisions since at least the mid-1970s.85 
Focusing on Standard & Poor’s (“S&P”) in particular, Rawi Abdelal 
points out that, at least through the 1980s, agencies did not seem to 
associate capital controls with heterodoxy. However, “S&P’s views on 
capital controls tracked the emergence of what appeared to be the new 
orthodoxy in both official policy circles, such as the IMF, and among 
financial market participants.”86 Thus, in the case of capital account 
liberalization, particularly in its heyday of the late 1980s and through the 
mid-1990s, a fairly unified reputational enforcement mechanism effectively 
strengthened the market rule of capital mobility as against the technical 
hard law of country choice. If a country chose to impose capital controls 
during this period, it could expect to be the subject of reputational 
 
 82. For more on reputation, see sources cited supra notes 4, 35, and 36. 
 83. See Lienau, supra note 35, at 26–32 (discussing the risk of oversimplifying the views of creditors 
and their likely reputational assessments, particularly in the sovereign debt continuity context).  
 84. Simmons & Elkins, supra note 4, at 173. 
 85. See generally Christopher M. Bruner & Rawi Abdelal, To Judge Leviathan: Sovereign Credit 
Ratings, National Law, and the World Economy, 25 J. Pub. Pol’y 191 (2005) (discussing the influence of 
credit rating agencies on markets in recent decades and arguing that these agencies should be required to 
provide nuanced ratings); see also Lienau, supra note 35, at 208–09. 
 86. Abdelal, supra note 55, at 182. 
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punishment, despite the existence of a hard law rule designed to ensure 
flexibility and policy space. 
Of course, and perhaps unsurprisingly, the market principle and 
associated informal policy favoring capital liberalization, which reached a 
high point in the mid-1990s, eventually fell into decline. Adam Feibelman 
notes the emergence, after 2008 in particular, of “a growing consensus 
among scholars and policymakers that states must carefully manage 
capital flows and coordinate their policies for doing so and that direct 
capital controls are a useful part of their policy toolkit in extreme 
circumstances.”87 The Fund’s post-2008 crisis approach, reflected in a new 
(that is, new as of 2012) institutional view of its multilateral surveillance 
goals, reflects a concern about the potential that cross-border capital flows 
can transmit financial instability.88 Kevin Gallagher notes that, more 
generally, the change in thinking about capital controls after the 2008 
financial crisis, including shifting views within the economics profession, 
has allowed more policy space for emerging market economies to regulate 
cross-border financial flows.89 Still, a look beyond narrow international 
finance law highlights that ideas and rules about cross-border capital 
liberalization have migrated outside the financial arena alone. Indeed, 
the earlier rule favored by the IMF seems to have been incorporated into 
other legal instruments, in particular international trade and investment 
instruments that escape the multilateral coordination undertaken by the 
IMF.90 
In short, in the realm of capital controls over the last several 
decades, it would be highly misleading to look at the hard law in order to 
understand the functioning rules. And no globally applicable soft law 
standards emerged to supplement the formal rule, despite the existence 
of codes of conduct relevant to smaller groups of states. But it would also 
be inaccurate to suggest that this important corner of the global legal order 
constituted a financial policy free-for-all. For a time, the hard law 
institutional shell of the IMF simultaneously provided the space for and was 
contravened by the exercise of a powerful, if ultimately somewhat unstable, 
 
 87. Feibelman, supra note 40, at 450. 
 88. See generally Int’l Monetary Fund, The Liberalization and Management of Capital Flows: 
An Institutional View (2012) (describing the increase of capital flows in recent years and how they are a 
key aspect of the global monetary system). 
 89. Kevin P. Gallagher, Ruling Capital: Emerging Markets and the Reregulation of Cross-
Border Finance 3 (2015). 
 90. Feibelman, supra note 40, 440–47. Gallagher too notes that: 
[A]t the IMF and at the G20, EMDs have succeeded in creating more room to regulate cross-
border finance but have been less successful in opening up space in the trade and investment 
regimes. . . . The result is a complicated patchwork of overlapping regimes that sends mixed 
signals to countries looking to regulate cross-border finance.  
Gallagher, supra note 89, at 3. For more on the interaction of capital account liberalization with trade 
and investment policy, see id. at 169–95. 
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market principle. The collective beliefs about market functioningand 
appropriate state actionheld by key policymakers and market actors 
countered the policy flexibility intended by the original international 
lawmakers of Bretton Woods in 1945. But the surveillance and technical 
assistance functions of the IMF nonetheless meant that Fund staff, through 
practices of policy promotion or aggressive persuasion, were able to press 
states to align their behavior with this market principle. At least for a time, 
the market principle itself thus effectively acted as a powerful rule in the 
global legal order, in spite of an official law allowing much greater sovereign 
policy space. 
C. The Background Law of Sovereign Debt Continuity 
If market principles can generate content for law and even act as 
counter-law in the face of already existing hard or soft guidelines, what 
impact might they have in the absence of any clear global legal directive? 
The issue of sovereign debt continuity offers a look at how collective 
beliefs about market functioning can operate without a clear institutional 
or legal anchor. It further demonstrates how market principles may 
constitute law-like rules themselves, which constrain actor behavior and 
can undermine efforts to develop alternative doctrines, particularly when 
these market ideas are backed by a unified reputational sanctioning 
mechanism. 
A core market principle in the sovereign debt arena is that 
sovereign states that fail to repay debt will undermine their access to 
capital markets, even if there are political or moral arguments that favor 
cancellation, including arguments related to major regime change.91 This 
market principle of sovereign debt continuity sets the background rule 
according to which nation-state borrowers are evaluated and against 
which creditors and others, including credit rating agencies, form their 
reputational judgments. This rule is not promulgated or enforced 
through any conventional legal format, such as a treaty.92 It is related to 
the general principle of pacta sunt servandathe basic idea that 
agreements or contracts must be respected. But pacta sunt servanda in 
domestic legal orders also implicates a range of caveats related to 
theories of agency and unconscionability that have not, it seems, fully 
translated into the international debt arena.93 
 
 91. See generally Lienau, supra note 35 (describing the problematic theoretical basis for and the 
historical development of the market principle of sovereign debt continuity). This Part draws considerably 
from this book. 
 92. Of course enforcement of particular sovereign debt instruments does interact with and to some 
degree depend upon this larger assumption. This is especially the case given the difficulty of enforcing 
judgments against sovereign debtors using mechanisms other than reputational sanction. 
 93. For a consideration of how standard equitable understandings in contract law might translate to 
the arena of sovereign debt, see generally Adam Feibelman, Equitable Subordination, Fraudulent Transfer, 
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Indeed, the background rule of sovereign debt continuity gains 
significant power from its popular identity as a market given, with 
ostensibly definite effects that can be identified and measured but that 
ultimately cannot be changed. This is hardly to say that a consistent 
repayment rule has not been criticized or normatively challenged. 
Activists and legal scholars have argued that there should be exceptions 
to this rule, especially in certain transitional political situations such as 
post-apartheid South Africa or post-Hussein Iraq.94 Largely driven by 
concerns about justice or fairness, they have proposed (or rather, 
resuscitated) an alternative standardthe doctrine of odious debtthat 
would allow debt to be cancelled if it either did not benefit the 
underlying population or was entered into without the population’s 
consent.95 However, development of this doctrine has not moved very far, 
at least in part due to the sense that it violates the already-existing and 
perhaps unavoidable market standard mandating uniform debt 
repayment. Interestingly, the belief in the virtual inevitability of this 
repayment ruleand also to some degree in the necessity of this rule for 
ongoing cooperation in sovereign lendingseems to be shared across 
creditors, borrowers, and other major international actors.96 Even those 
successor states that might wish for a different ruleand might be in a 
strong moral position to press for the alternative approachtend to 
accede to the market narrative. As Robert Howse noted in a study for 
the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development: 
[O]ne of the major policy concerns that has deterred some transitional 
regimes from repudiating ‘odious’ debt from the previous regime is that of 
reputation in the capital markets; a transitional regime may be concerned 
that creditors will not in the future provide access to funds, because they 
are unable to distinguish the exceptional political decision to repudiate 
debt due to its odiousness from the general creditworthiness of the 
regime.97 
In effect, the market principle itselfthe belief that nonpayment will 
result in capital market sanctions across all casesseems to be doing a 
 
and Sovereign Debt, 70 Law & Contemp. Probs. 171 (2007); Anna Gelpern, Odious, Not Debt, 70 Law & 
Contemp. Probs. 81 (2007); Robert Howse, The Concept of Odious Debt in Public International Law 
(United Nations Conference on Trade and Dev., Discussion Paper No. 185, 2007). 
 94. For a discussion of the South African and Iraqi cases, see Lienau, supra note 35, at 191–92, 210–15; 
see also Jai Damle, The Odious Debt Doctrine After Iraq, 70 Law & Contemp. Probs. 139, 139–41 (2007). 
 95. The early formulation was first offered by Alexander Sack in 1927. A.-N. Sack, Les Effets des 
Transformations des États sur leurs Dettes Publiques et Autres Obligations Financières tome II 
157 (1927). 
 96. For example, a 2003 Financial Times leader noted in light of the Saddam Hussein debt repudiation 
discussions: “The principle [being attacked] is sovereign continuitythe idea that governments should honor 
debts contracted by predecessors. Without this, there would be no lending to governments.” Lienau, supra 
note 35, at 5 (alteration in original). 
 97. Howse, supra note 93, at 20. 
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significant portion of the work in structuring the rules and norms 
according to which this global arena functions. 
Still, despite its seeming strength, the debt continuity rule should 
not be mistaken for an inevitable feature of the financial world. As I 
have detailed more fully in previous research, the market principle 
narrative supporting the repayment rule is both theoretically problematic 
and also insufficiently supported by the historical evidence.98 To begin 
with, the framing and understanding of sovereign debt repayment and 
reputation as a market principle works in part by propagating the 
following three flawed assumptions. First, the dominant approach implies 
that although creditors may assess a specific borrower’s political 
characteristics through the lens of sovereign risk, judgments about a 
borrower’s repayment decisions are not shaped by politics per se. Rather, 
they are simply the best objective assessment of a given set of material 
facts, and are therefore unchallengeable on the basis of political or moral 
principle. The second flawed assumption is that the mechanism of 
sovereign reputation itself is assumed to be similarly free from subjective 
and historically variable political judgments and, therefore, similarly 
immune from challenge. And the third assumption is that all rational 
creditors are expected to respond in basically the same way to particular 
debt events, suggesting that efforts to understand or reshape their 
interests would be futile.99 
But in fact none of these assumptions hold up to closer examination, 
which means that the strict debt repayment norm should be more 
politically and historically variable than it first appearsmore like other 
manmade laws than like the regularities of physics. To begin with, any 
discussion of “sovereign” debt is rendered intelligible only by implicitly 
incorporating one of the most highly politicized and deeply contested 
terms in international law and international relations: sovereignty.100 
Depending on the theory of sovereignty implicitly or explicitly adopted, 
the practices of sovereign debt and reputation can be expected to diverge 
significantly.101 A theory of sovereignty that considers the population to 
be merely subject to whichever government is in power should embrace a 
debt continuity norm without much difficulty. After all, democratic voice 
and popular benefit are irrelevant under this traditionalist or absolutist 
approach. Conversely, if a theory of sovereignty privileging popular 
 
 98. See generally Lienau, supra note 35 (explaining the historical and theoretical problems that 
arise when the market principle narrative is used to support the repayment rule). 
 99. Id. at 2–7 (describing the theoretical basis for and the historical development of the market principle 
of sovereign debt continuity). 
 100. See, e.g., Jens Bartelson, A Genealogy of Sovereignty (1995); Robert Jackson, Sovereignty: 
The Evolution of an Idea (2013); Stephen D. Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (1999) 
(offering different perspectives on the nature and meaning of sovereignty). 
 101. See Lienau, supra note 35, at 34–52. 
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control or public benefit is accepted, then a debt contract signed by a 
nondemocratic governmentparticularly a contract that did not aim to (or 
actually) benefit the underlying populationshould not be presumptively 
enforceable against successive regimes. Furthermore, creditor uniformity 
cannot simply be assumed, given the multiple competing pressures in 
debt markets and also the varying political viewpoints that creditors 
might reasonably find compelling. In fact, different creditors may 
interpretand historically have interpretedthe same politicized debt 
repudiation in opposing ways.102 
As with the capital controls example previously discussed, factors 
promoting or undermining ideological consensus along these lines should 
impact the strength of the market principle and therefore the amount of 
policy space actually allowed to state actorsall despite the absence of 
any recognizable global hard or soft law rule on the issue.103 In particular, 
the degree of consensus supporting debt continuity should impact the 
strength of its reputational sanction at any given historical moment. It is 
hard to imagine a state being punished for paying back even highly 
questionable debt. However, the reputational response to nonpayment 
will likely vary with consensus on the market principle, and therefore 
with the material and ideational elements that support or undermine that 
consensus.104 In periods of relatively uniform support for debt continuity, 
states will have less leeway and will be more broadly punished for 
refusing to repay even arguably illegitimate debt. Conversely, states may 
have more policy space when the uniformity is undermined.105 
This encourages a closer look at the historical development and 
potential variability of the market principle itself. Unlike the capital 
controls example, in which the IMF plays a particularly dominant role, 
there is no apparent hard law shell to house the market principle of debt 
continuity. Also unlike the capital controls example, there is a less clear 
and circumscribed time period that invites closer consideration.106 Still, it is 
possible to recognize the functioning of the debt continuity principle in 
the global arena, and even to identify periods in which more or less 
consensus existed.107 Although the debt continuity rule plays an 
important function in the global legal ordereffectively constituting an 
injunction against debt cancellations on the basis of principleits shaky 
theoretical claim to inevitability is joined by a degree of historical 
 
 102. For the theoretical argument on creditworthiness, see id. at 26–32. 
 103. For a discussion on the relevance of consensus to the strength of a reputational compliance 
mechanism, see Simmons & Elkins, supra note 4, at 173. 
 104. For more on the specific interaction between reputation and ideas of sovereign legitimacy, see 
Lienau, supra note 35, at 24–28, 34–52. 
 105. Id. at 29–32. 
 106. For the capital controls example, see the discussion supra in Part I.B. 
 107. For a more comprehensive summary of periodization, see Lienau, supra note 35, at 13–15. 
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instability in its application. This historical contingency only strengthens 
the contention that the debt continuity rule is manmadea social 
construction rather than an inevitabilitythough admittedly not in the 
deliberately rule-selecting method of law conventionally understood. 
So where can we see the rule of debt continuity at work, and where 
do we see its weakening? This is somewhat complicated, as the effective 
functioning of this market principle results in a series of noneventsstate 
actors deciding against debt cancellation, particularly after a regime 
change, despite the possibility of a cancellation on the basis of principled 
claims about sovereign legitimacy.108 Still, for preliminary insight into its 
impact, we can take a closer look at cases of major regime change. Given 
that these tend to be associated with arguments about the illegitimacy of 
the previous regime, we might reasonably expect these states to consider 
principled debt cancellation.109  
Another difficult question is when to begin this historical analysis, 
particularly given that shifts in the market principle of debt continuity do 
not have as clear a starting point as in the capital controls example. Still, 
some guidance can be drawn from the arguments that a state might 
present in favor of debt cancellation, particularly given that any claims 
grounded in assertions about sovereign legitimacy would have to find an 
audience willing to at least consider such arguments. This points to 
beginning this analysis in the post-World War I era, when ideas of 
sovereign legitimacy related to self-determination and popular control 
first became universalized and might reasonably have been more broadly 
accepted.110 
Two relatively well-known cases of debt repudiation in the post-
World War I era involve the Soviet Union and Costa Rica. Though the 
cases differ in virtually every other respect, both of these countries 
repudiated the contracts of previous regimesthose of the tsarist regime 
and the government of the dictator Federico Tinoco,111 respectivelyon 
the basis of claims about legitimacy. Interestingly, at least in economics 
and political science, these casesand particularly the Soviet caseare 
sometimes held up to suggest the futility of challenging timeless 
principles of capital markets.112 But in fact a closer consideration of these 
events demonstrates quite the opposite, showing how creditors can 
 
 108. Sovereign default without a claim to principle is, of course, much more common and may also 
be subject to reputational sanction. For a general consideration of the role of reputation in enforcing 
sovereign debt agreements, see Tomz, supra note 34. 
 109. For more on case selection for thinking through debt continuity, see Lienau, supra note 35, at 
52–55. 
 110. For further information on the ideological shifts in the post-World War I era, see id. at 59–65. 
 111. See generally Lienau, supra note 35, at chs. 3, 4 (discussing the political and economic context 
and the consequences of these two repudiations, respectively).  
 112. Michael Tomz, for example, cites a number of commentators from the period in support of this 
view. Tomz, supra note 34, at 80. 
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reasonably make reputational judgments in favor of post-repudiation 
lending, at least under conditions of market competition and ideological 
flexibility. The Soviet case in particular has been misinterpreted in the 
literature, presented as an example of a strong and universal reputational 
sanction for principled repudiation.113 However, attending to the 
historical bank correspondence rather than only to bond float data 
demonstrates that private interest did in fact exist in lending to the new 
Soviet regime, at least among new American banks eager to compete 
with established European financiers.114 The Costa Rican case culminated 
in a well-known arbitration in which U.S. Chief Justice William Howard 
Taft distinguished between debt contracted for “personal” as opposed to 
“legitimate government” purposes, and found that only legitimate debt 
could survive a regime’s demise to bind the subsequent government.115 
Notwithstanding the repudiation or the decision in its favor, Costa Rica 
was not blocked from capital markets in subsequent years. All of this 
goes to demonstrate that, although the market principle of debt 
continuity may act as an effective rule today, this rule is hardly inevitable 
or unchangeable. Its strength, including through the reputational 
mechanism supporting the rule, depends on maintaining a degree of 
consensus and in particular a uniform response of disapproval. 
What happened in the decades following these notable cases of 
repudiation? The absence of similar examples with a muted reputational 
response suggests a subsequent strengthening of the market principle of 
debt continuity after World War II. Despite regime changes and 
repudiations in the cases of China and Cuba, as well as significant 
dissatisfaction with expectations of debt repayment elsewhere, any effort 
to challenge debt continuity was met with marginalization in international 
credit markets.116 But this narrowing of the ideological consensus in 
sovereign debt was hardly embedded in apolitical market certainties or 
ahistorical creditor preferences. Rather, the departure from the more open 
post-World War I moment resulted from changing political structures and 
sovereignty norms, as well as from shifts in creditor interactions. The post-
World War II reconstruction of the financial system was led by public 
creditors such as the new World Bank, as opposed to the competitive 
private creditors of the post-World War I era, who had withdrawn from 
international lending after the wave of sovereign defaults during the 
Great Depression. And the World Bank promoted sovereign debt 
practices that comported with its own financial and operational needs, 
 
 113. Id. 
 114. Lienau, supra note 35, at 88–91. 
 115. Judicial Decisions Involving Questions of International Law: Arbitration Between Great Britain 
and Costa Rica, 18 Am. J. Int’l L. 147, 168 (1924) (providing opinion and award of William H. Taft, Sole 
Arbitrator). For a discussion of Taft’s decision, see Lienau, supra note 35, at 109–16. 
 116. For information on Cuba and China in particular, see Lienau, supra note 35, at 149–53. 
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including a strict insistence on debt repayment that helped to regularize 
and naturalize debt continuity as a dominant market principle going 
forward.117 
When private creditors returned to sovereign lending in the early 
1970s, they arrived through a framework of syndicated lending and 
multinational branching that undermined the space for more flexible 
approaches and further consolidated consensus around a narrow 
repayment rule.118 Notably, sovereign states themselves, increasingly 
wary of external scrutiny of their internal political and economic choices, 
hardly forced an open discussion of political principles in the debt 
arena.119 This background affected the subsequent loan restructurings of 
the late 1970s and 1980s. In particular, the systemic risk posed by the 
private banks’ interconnected loansand the banks’ interaction with 
public actors such as the IMF and the U.S. Treasuryresulted in a joint 
approach to sovereign borrowers that limited the space for alternative 
approaches to debt.120 Thus, despite being grounded in very particular 
historical moments, these shifts granted the rule of debt repayment an air 
of inevitability into the 1990s, and meant that even clearly revolutionary 
governments in Nicaragua, Iran, the Philippines, and South Africa 
ultimately acknowledged the debts of their predecessors.121 
This history demonstrates the power and resilience of the market 
principle of debt continuity, but also suggests that it is not necessarily an 
inevitable feature of the global legal order. Its strength has depended on the 
existence of consensus among market participants and other international 
actorsa consensus that was in turn shaped over the last century by 
political actors, broader ideological shifts, and changing public and private 
creditor structures. The post-World War I cases, which underscore how 
lending can function even in the absence of this supposed market given, 
further suggest that the rule is hardly essential for a workable sovereign 
debt regime. Alternative approaches incorporating ideas of illegitimate 
debt and allowing for limited cancellation have emerged historically and 
could function more fully in the future. Indeed, the post-Cold War era 
has witnessed the international move toward a discourse of governance, 
democracy, and human rights, which has made its way into the language 
(if not fully the practice) of even major economic organizations and 
private creditor groups.122 Although expectations of uniform repayment 
still dominate, new modes of creditor interaction and new sources of 
international capital have further enabled flexibility in certain cases. For 
 
 117. For further information on the World Bank’s role, see id. at 126–44. 
 118. See, e.g., id. at 155–60. 
 119. Id. at 163–65. 
 120. See, e.g., id. at 166–71. 
 121. Id. at 174–92. 
 122. For a discussion on this shifting language, see id. at 194–200. 
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example, recent debt discussions in Iraq, Ecuador, and even Europe have 
brought arguments about illegitimate debt more clearly to light.123 
Thus, the sovereign debt continuity example highlights how a market 
principle, supported by a reputational sanction mechanism, may limit a 
state’s policy space and undermine the development of alternative 
doctrines even in the absence of any official global directive. However, 
this example also demonstrates the mistake in any suggestion that this is 
an inevitable and ahistorical set of constraints rather than a product of 
the interactions and decisions of various historically situated actors. At a 
more general or theoretical level, it further shows how market principles 
mayin addition to working through the background of conventional 
hard and soft law or by countering officially existing lawindependently 
constitute law-like rules themselves. These market givens can become a 
powerful part of the global legal order through multiple mechanisms with 
varying degrees of formality, all while remaining in the background and 
escaping the scrutiny accorded to “law” itself. 
D. Definitional Complexities 
Although the preceding examples help to demonstrate the potential 
impact of market principles, they also point to another key feature of this 
category of rules or constraintsnamely, its variability. While I have 
defined market principles as collective beliefs about how markets work 
as an objective matter, this definition immediately raises several difficult 
questions: How can a market principle be simultaneously stable enough 
to generate an impact but also ultimately changeable? Is it always the 
case that there is a concrete market principle relevant to every issue 
area? This Article does not at all suggest that every idea held about 
markets is sufficiently strong or stable to be a market principle, or that 
there will always be a market principle on point. Certainly, there could 
be issue areas for which no law or rule of any sort holds, in which case an 
actor’s policy space or range of potential behavior is much greater, 
whether for good or ill. Similarly, there may be times during which no 
market principle seems to apply, even if one existed in years prior. It is 
also possible that certain geographic regions or sub-communities are not 
subject to a market principle that otherwise appears to be global.124 My 
contention is not that the legal order overflows with clearly delineated 
and broadly accepted market principles; they are not simply synonymous 
with individually held ideas of market functioning. However, market 
principles may have a powerful impact at certain moments, for particular 
issue areas, and perhaps in certain communities. The goal of this Article, 
 
 123. For a discussion of these examples, see id. at 210–25. 
 124. One can imagine the relative bifurcation of the globe during the Cold War as leading to an 
only partial application of market principles, for example. 
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as detailed more fully in Part III.A, is to encourage lawyers to be 
attentive to the role and impact of market principles when they do 
emerge and to incorporate them into legal analysis and activity when 
relevant. 
Of course, this raises the further question of how to know when 
market principles have in fact emerged. How collectively held must these 
beliefs about market functioning be to count? Who should hold or 
transmit them? And is there not always contestation and controversy in 
any supposedly collective belief about the market? One great virtue of 
law, traditionally understood, is its cognizability; it involves a relatively 
straightforward promulgation of guidelines by some definite body 
claiming authority.125 Market principles may be relatively clear in their 
directive content and even broadly shared without being obviously 
promulgated or disseminated by a determinate institution or individual. 
This means that the contours of the collectivity holding the belief are 
necessarily flexible and historically contingent, roughly encompassing a 
community of understanding and action around a particular issue area.126 
This also means, as discussed further in Part III.C, that questions about 
rulemaking and rulemakers are inevitably complicated. The particular 
mechanisms by which rules are formulated, transmitted, and enforced 
will almost certainly vary across different market principles. That said, as 
demonstrated by the preceding examples, the international institutions 
and epistemic or expert communities discussed in other arenas of global 
governance will often play a part.127 
In addition, it is absolutely the case that there will be controversy 
and contestation about particular market principlesthe debt continuity 
and capital mobility rules had detractors, for example, even as they 
continued to shape action and reputational consequences. Indeed, this 
contestation is present for any collective belief about how things work as 
an ostensibly objective matter, be it in the social or natural sciences. As 
such, it is difficult to specify in advance the threshold beyond which a 
market principle ceases to exist and becomes merely a collective 
discussion or disagreement about various market ideas in a given issue 
area. As discussed more fully in Part III.D, the ideological consensus that 
reputationally supports a market principle can be fractured to the point 
 
 125. For a classic delineation of the features of a legal order, see the discussion of Lon Fuller in 
Part II.B. 
 126. This draws roughly from an understanding of norms generally as expectations of appropriate 
behavior shared by a community of actors. For a broader consideration of how norms, discourse, and 
expectations interact and relate to concepts of power and interest, see Lienau, supra note 35, at 15–17. 
This approach also draws from understandings of epistemic communities in political science and 
sociology. See, e.g., Peter M. Haas, Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy 
Coordination, 46 Int’l Org. 1, 35 (1992); Emanuel Adler, Communitarian International Relations: 
The Epistemic Foundations of International Relations (Barry Buzan & Richard Little eds., 2005). 
 127. See sources cited supra note 126 and accompanying text. 
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that it stops constraining actor behavior, thus reopening policy space that 
may have been closed. Indeed, part of the goal of this Article is to 
encourage precisely the kind of legal attention and controversy that might 
undermine those market principles that individuals find normatively 
lacking. Therefore, as with many rulesfrom capital mobility to the 
Fourteenth Amendmentit rests with those studying and applying the 
rule to assess its contours and strength, and even to decide whether it is 
determinate enough at a particular moment to warrant attention. 
These questions on line-drawing could (and perhaps should) 
continue indefinitely. And a more definitive set of answers delineating 
precise boundaries would no doubt be far more satisfying. But such 
clarity would be disingenuous and premature from my perspective, as I 
intend this Article to be a first cut at these concepts and issues and an 
invitation to further study by other scholars. Ultimately, as with my 
understanding of the concept of law itself, the boundaries of the market 
principle category are not perfectly precise, and its content is somewhat 
flexible. Still, this framework is worth further consideration given the 
power that market principles can have in the global legal order when 
they are sufficiently identifiable and determinate. 
II.  Why “Law”? 
Even if one accepts the importance of market principles in shaping 
facets of international law and coordinated global practice, it may still be 
a stretch to refer to these market givens as of the legal order itself, as 
opposed to just an external constraint or element affecting that order. 
What is the threshold for calling something laweven hidden lawbefore 
we move into the realm of implausible overinclusivity? I begin this Part by 
noting that the category of law itself has hardly been stable and that, 
particularly in the international arena, many scholars and practitioners 
have struggled to defineand have ultimately chosen to expandthe 
scope of their attention and practice. Although market principles currently 
stand outside these already flexible global boundaries, this Article suggests 
that they too belong on this continuum of global law, especially given that 
their impact can be as important as more conventionally understood 
“law.” It further argues that this categorization is plausible because 
market principles tend to have many of the characteristics that we 
associate with the conceptual category of law, although of course they 
are not self-consciously promulgated as law. 
I want to emphasize that the goal here is not to determine the 
nature of law as a general philosophical matter or to classify market 
principles as a type of law out of fidelity to an imagined essential concept 
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of law.128 Although this Article refers to Lon Fuller’s frequently-used 
definition of legal standards and to the work of other legal philosophers, 
this is not to elevate or enshrine these particular characterizations as 
definitive. Furthermore, this Article does not conceive of the legal order 
as a binary in which there is a clear dividing line between law and not-
law. Friedrich Kratochwil’s use of Wittgensteinian understandings of 
language in his characterization of law is apt here: Law as a concept can 
be understood as a family resemblance. Like a rope, it is “made up of 
many strings without one string, representing the core, going through the 
whole length.”129 Kratochwil further notes that law is “a language game in 
which different exemplars exhibit different features rather than one 
‘essential characteristic.’”130 Drawing from this definition, my aim here is 
to bring market principles within the family of those politically 
constructed directives and rules that we generally understand to be part 
of global law. 
It is important to reiterate that bringing these market givens into the 
ambit of law does not necessarily mean that they are desirable elements 
of the legal order or that they should be enforceable by courts. Certainly, 
many rules are conceived of as part of law even though their normative 
and source validity are heavily contested. Rather, as will become clearer 
in Part III, the principal goal of this Article is to argue thatparticularly 
given the relatively flexible and inclusive understandings of global law 
already prevalentmarket principles belong not at the margins of, but 
rather squarely within, the field of legal vision, criticism, and activity. 
A. The Expanding Global Legal Order 
To begin with, how strictly delineated and how binary is the 
contemporary understanding of the global legal order? Recent decades 
have seen an expansion of the governance activities understood to fall 
within the scope of “international law” and therefore clearly within the 
purview of international lawyers and legal scholars. Traditionally, the 
sources of international law, as laid out in Article 38(1) of the Statute of 
the International Court of Justice (“the ICJ Statute”), include treaties, 
customary international law (evidenced by state practice accompanied by 
a sense of legal obligation, or opinio juris), and “general principles of law 
 
 128. This would, in the words of Friedrich Kratochwil, “mistakenly assume that concepts ‘work’ by 
reference rather than by their link to other concepts and to practices that authorize, forbid, or require a 
certain conduct.” Friedrich Kratochwil, The Status of Law in World Society: Meditations on the Role 
and Rule of Law 53 (2014). Acknowledging a conceptual debt to Richard Rorty, Kratochwil notes that such 
attempts “derive from a false notion of language as a simple mirror of the ‘world out there.’” Id. at 53. 
 129. Id. at 53 (characterizing Ludwig Wittgenstein’s rope example). For more on the idea of family 
resemblance as a way to think through the notion or concept of a “game,” see Ludwig Wittgenstein, 
Philosophical Investigations (G. E. M. Anscombe trans., 1968), ¶¶ 66–67. 
 130. Kratochwil, supra note 128, at 74. 
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recognized by civilized nations.”131 The boundaries, content, and force of 
each of these sources of canonical international law are controversial in 
their own right. But, even when criticized, they are recognized as legal 
materials and questions, with a potentially significant impact mediated or 
framed through legal mechanisms and legal argument, and thus properly 
deserving the attention of lawyers. 
That said, these traditional sources are hardly the only rule forms now 
anointed with the label “law.” Legal scholars, along with students of other 
disciplines, have directed considerable thought to governance forms that 
do not result from the explicit and high-level state activity traditionally 
associated with international law but that nonetheless generate powerful 
rules across important issue areas. As part of this research, the lawmaking 
activities of international organizations, effectively independent of their 
state members, have been extensively studied and criticized.132 Scholars 
have also assessed the rulemaking that exists on a smaller scale than the 
major multilateral conventions, constituting forms of “minilateral” 
cooperation more “modest in size, formality, and even inclusiveness.”133 
The important role of “soft law” informal guidelines and codes of conduct, 
which are not necessarily enforceable in their own right, and which may not 
even mandate action, is well-acknowledged.134 Attention has been paid to 
the role of government networks in the formulation of such guidelines and 
in providing the foundations for global governance.135 The codes and 
conventions of entirely private actors and networks have been studied as 
part of the legal order, from the medieval lex mercatoria to the private 
conventions promulgated by today’s multinational corporations.136 And 
 
 131. Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38(1)(a)–(c). The statute further clarifies that 
“subsidiary” means for determining or interpreting the content of traditional international law may also 
include the “teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations.” Id. art. 38(1)(d). 
Although technically these sources are listed as applicable to the International Court of Justice, in 
practice the statute is generally followed by other courts as well. See, e.g., Jenny S. Martinez, Towards an 
International Judicial System, 56 Stan. L. Rev. 429, 482–83 (2003). 
 132. See, e.g., José E. Alvarez, International Organizations as Law-Makers (2006). This connects to 
a broader tradition in political science investigating the role of international organizations in global 
governance. See generally Michael Barnett & Martha Finnemore, Rules for the World: International 
Organizations in Global Politics (2004); Karns & Mingst, supra note 28.  
 133. Chris Brummer, Minilateralism: How Trade Alliances, Soft Law and Financial Engineering 
are Redefining Economic Statecraft 2 (2014). 
 134. See, e.g., all sources cited supra note 132; Informal International Lawmaking (Joost Pauwelyn 
et al. eds., 2012). 
 135. See generally Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World Order (2004) (providing a paradigmatic 
example). 
 136. Lex mercatoria can be defined as: 
[A] body of oral, customary mercantile law which developed in medieval Europe and was 
administered quite uniformly across Europe by merchant judges, adjudicating disputes between 
merchants. In the contemporary world, some scholars believe that there exists a modern lex 
mercatoria, defined to include certain transnational trade usages and commercial customs 
recognized internationally by the mercantile community. 
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scholars and proponents of global administrative law, which aims to 
promote the accountability of global administrative bodies, openly admit 
that the “law” moniker in their context “diverges from, and can be sharply 
in tension with the classical models of consent-based interstate 
international law and most models of national law.”137 In short, rules and 
norms formulated at multiple levels of decisionmaking, devised by many 
types of actors, and involving varying degrees of formality and 
enforceability have been incorporated into our understanding of global 
law and the legal order. 
To be sure, not everyone is pleased with these developments. As 
noted in this Article’s conclusion, scholars have highlighted the risks 
involved in overexpanding the category of international law. Certainly 
the normative desirability of such “law,” along with its enforceability 
through particular courts or other adjudicatory and enforcement 
institutions, remain important questions. But it is clear that both the real-
world practice of rule generation and the scholarly study of arguably 
legal forms have expanded. Setting aside questions of desirability or 
enforcement for the moment, seriously addressing this new, possibly 
lawmaking, range of activity has improved our understanding of the 
global arena. 
B. Nondeliberate Rules in the International Arena 
How do market principles fit in here and why can they plausibly be 
understood as a distinct but related element of this expanded global legal 
order? Or, in other words, why is it the case that our expanded 
understanding of global law and lawmaking has not gone far enough? 
While the terms “belief,” “rule,” and “law” have been used fairly loosely 
in this Article, they deserve greater specification. I have already clarified 
that the collective beliefs about markets that interest me here are causal 
beliefsbeliefs about how markets work as an objective matter. In my 
view, such a shared belief can form the core of a directive or rule, with a 
“rule” understood simply as a standard that guides conduct. This 
conversion or translation happens quietly and naturally, rather than 
through explicit rule formation. As noted previously, the collectively 
held belief that sovereign states that fail to repay sovereign debt will 
harm their reputation, even despite political or moral arguments that 
 
Lex Mercatoria Law and Legal Definition, USLegal.com, https://definitions.uslegal.com/l/lex-mercatoria/ 
(last visited Mar. 11, 2017). The nature and scope of lex mercatoria and its relationship to earlier historical 
forms that might have existed remains a subject of debate. See generally Nikitas E. Hatzimihail, The Many 
Livesand Facesof Lex Mercatoria: History as Genealogy in International Business Law, 71 Law & 
Contemp. Probs. 169 (2008) (considering the uses of history in understandings of lex mercatoria). 
 137. Benedict Kingsbury, The Concept of ‘Law’ in Global Administrative Law, 20 Eur. J. Int’l L. 23, 26 
(2009); see Nico Krisch & Benedict Kingsbury, Introduction: Global Governance and Global Administrative 
Law in the International Legal Order, 17 Eur. J. Int’l L. 1, 10 (2006). 
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favor cancellation, is a market principle that has proven powerful in 
contemporary international finance. This belief generates a concomitant 
rule or standard“Repay sovereign debt”that effectively guides the 
action of states and serves as a basis for judgment and evaluation. It even 
includes a built-in sanction: “Repay sovereign debt, or suffer 
reputational harm.” 
The point here is not that market principles directly generate (or 
are) technical or hard “law” themselves. This certainly is not the case, 
particularly if one comes anywhere close to accepting the definition 
found in the ICJ Statutethough, as just highlighted, global law seems to 
have already escaped these traditionalist bounds. These market 
principles are not soft law either, in the sense of informal codes or 
guidelines established by a subset of state, non-state, or sub-state actors. 
Still, the market principles I am interested in do something akin to legal 
work, acting in many ways like law, though without the deliberate 
formulation. While there is considerable controversy surrounding the 
nature of law, legal rules, and legal norms, among the most widely 
employed characterizations is Lon Fuller’s understanding of the rule of 
law as involving eight core principles. In Fuller’s view, legal standards 
should be: (1) general (in that they are generally applicable rules as opposed 
to one-time directives); (2) promulgated (publicly known); (3) clear; 
(4) prospective; (5) consistent (that is, not in conflict with other legal 
standards); (6) satisfiable; (7) stable; and (8) applied.138 This basic 
understanding is echoed with various permutations across multiple 
schools of jurisprudence, though it is admittedly an ideal. Indeed, any 
legal standard will almost certainly violate one or more of these 
elements, for example, by being interpretively ambiguous, not in 
complete concert with other legal rules, subject to change, and less than 
perfectly followed or enforced. Any law can be challenged to a degree 
without losing its basic legal character, though of course there may be 
line-drawing questions on when a rule is violated so frequently as to no 
longer exist. 
Accepting Fuller’s basic characterization for the purposes of this 
Article, however, at least some market principles share many of these 
characteristics and function in a law-like mannercoordinating and 
constituting social interaction and guiding actor conduct in ways that 
satisfy many and perhaps almost all of the characteristics of the rule of 
law. To return to sovereign debt continuity, the rule “Repay sovereign 
debt” is recognized as general, well-known, clear, prospective, satisfiable, 
seemingly stable over time, and appliedat least in the sense that a 
reputational cost is expected to result from its violation. This rule is 
arguably consistent with other legal standards, at least with a simplified 
 
 138. See, e.g., Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law 33–39 (rev. ed. 1969). 
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version of the basic rules of contract understood to dominate the global 
economy. There is no public promulgation as a law, which this Article 
fully acknowledgesthese principles are “law in hiding,” after all. 
Still, even if, as a narrow definitional matter, there are grounds for 
suggesting that market principles may have law-like characteristics, this 
understanding is perhaps overexpansive, lacking any real limiting factor. 
If this is the analytical mechanism for translating a causal belief (via its 
embedded conduct-guiding standard) into a rule in a legal order, then 
virtually any causal belief or any understanding about how the world 
works can be a law. This brings to mind the saying: “Gravity. It’s Not Just 
a Good Idea. It’s the Law!”139 This statement is absurd (and amusing) in 
part because of the implication that gravity is an idea that can be 
subjectively accepted or rejectedrather than a mere fact or 
unchangeable forceand also because of the suggestion that our 
compliance with the rule of gravity would be enhanced if this rule were to 
be understood or enacted as law. 
Even beyond “rules” or “laws” that command action over which we 
have no control“comply with gravity” being the paradigmatic 
examplenot all directives aimed at real actionable choices should 
necessarily be recognized as rules, much less as laws. Andrei Marmor 
points out that rules should be distinguished from generally recognized 
reasons or strategies underpinning a particular action. He offers the game 
of chess as an example: “[O]ne can say, ‘Don’t ever move the king when . . .’; 
and this sounds very much like a rule. But the formulation is potentially 
misleading. . . . When you point out a sound strategy . . . . [y]ou just sum up 
the reasons that apply independently, in a rule-like formulation.”140 In a 
similar vein, Kratochwil highlights that a given category of rules “might 
simply embody experiential knowledge concerning the causal nexus 
among natural phenomena and the likelihood of attaining one’s goals in 
given circumstances. The obvious examples for this category are 
‘instruction-type’ rules such as ‘do not plant tomatoes before 15 April.’”141 
In short, these “rules” are actually only implicit summaries of facts and the 
ramifications of contrary action in the face of such facts: Assuming ABC 
goal, do not take EFG action or face XYZ consequences. 
Given these distinctions, why are “repay sovereign debt” and “don’t 
impose capital controls” not more like one of these aforementioned 
examplesnot so inevitable as gravity, in that the possibility of contrary 
action does exist, but nonetheless still just reformulations of knowledge 
 
 139. There are many variations on this themefor example, “Obey Gravity. It’s the Law!”but the 
original phrase is claimed by Gerry Mooney in 1977. The History of the Gravity Poster, Gerry Mooney 
Studio, http://www.thegravityposter.com/historyof_01.html (last visited Mar. 11, 2017). 
 140. Marmor, supra note 11, at 14–15. 
 141. Friedrich V. Kratochwil, Rules, Norms, and Decisions: On the Conditions of Practical and 
Legal Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Affairs 72–73 (1989). 
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about near-natural phenomena? Or, put differently, why are market 
principles plausibly understood as “rules” that might credibly be part of 
an emerging (but ultimately changeable) global legal order? As Scott 
Shapiro notes of the gravity example, “[t]he joke works not only because 
it is crazy to admonish people to obey the laws of physics, but equally 
because it isn’t crazy to insist that they heed the laws of political 
institutions.”142 This political, constructed element is crucial, and if we 
relax our definition of political institutions to encompass the motley 
array of rule- and norm-generating actors in the global arena, it remains 
highly applicable. 
Indeed, central to this Article’s argument is the contention that 
market givens are, for the most part, less like rules of physics (or chess or 
tomato planting) and more like the rules constructed by political 
institutionsalbeit without the process, intent, or decree-like language 
usually associated with traditional legal rules. This is likely to be the case 
even when a market principle is understood to be objective and inevitable 
at any given moment. Of course, market principles can certainly be 
understood to exist on a continuum, varying across the spectrum of 
inevitability or permanencetake as a more stable example the “law” of 
supply and demand, which observes that prices rise with increased 
demand, assuming supply is held constant. But my contention is that the 
rebuttable presumption ought to favor understanding these market 
principles as socially and politically formed over time, and as giving rise 
to ultimately manmade (if not self-awarely chosen) rules in the global 
arena. Such constructedness may seem fairly uncontroversial when we 
take a closer look at any particular topic, as suggested by the capital 
controls and debt continuity examples. Yet the ways that these 
constructed beliefs fit into the map of other international rule formsthe 
ways in which they can direct, block, interpret, or otherwise act in a law-
like mannerremain overlooked. In other words, when viewed from a 
more traditional legal lens, these market givens still fade into the 
background. 
In an important essay in the field of socio-economics, Michel Callon 
argues that it is “wrong to talk of laws or, worse still, of the law of the 
market. There exist only temporary, changing laws associated with 
specific markets.”143 This insight is in many ways accurate but, as in so 
many fields, it uses law largely as an under-specified metaphor. Part of 
my argument is that we need to take this use of the term “law” much 
more seriouslythat lawyers in particular should ask about the ways in 
which market principles actually function as a frequently silent element 
of the legal order and therefore should be uncovered and studied as such. 
 
 142. Scott J. Shapiro, Legality 201 (2011). 
 143. Laws of the Markets 47 (Michel Callon ed., 1998). 
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If we focus on this broader picture of law, then the continuities between 
market principles and other international rule forms become more 
apparent. If a market principle is indeed more like a rule of political 
institutionsgeneral, well-known, clear, prospective, satisfiable, applied, 
and stable for a time, but ultimately socio-politically constructed and 
historically contingentin other words, a law of sortsthen contemplating 
how it works in the global legal order is sensical and perhaps even called for. 
Indeed, to the extent that the principle, along with its associated practices, is 
not acknowledged to be part of the legal order, it retains an element of legal 
character while escaping the scrutiny and challenge usually accorded to legal 
rules, acting effectively as a “law in hiding.” 
III.  The Ramifications of Expanding “Law” 
If it is plausible to think of market principles as within the boundaries 
of the international legal order, what are the consequences of doing so? As 
acknowledged in the Introduction, my motivation derives in part from an 
interest in the ramifications of this analytical recasting. Indeed, the 
expansion of law in the international arena to include less traditional legal 
categories, just noted in Part II.A, seems to have resulted in part from the 
strategic or political considerations of international scholars and 
practitioners.144 Speaking of the translation or reframing of the normative 
concept of transparency into a principle relevant to international law, 
Andrea Bianchi notes that: 
The “translation” is compelled by the well-known hostility of the lawyerly 
world towards what positivists would call “extra-legal considerations.” 
Unless something is expressed in a form that is couched in legal terms, it 
has a slim chance of being accepted within the discipline. Hence the need 
to qualify as “principles” those concepts that would otherwise have no 
standing in the world of legal imagery and representation.145 
So what does it really mean to have standing in the world of legal 
representationas a normative principle or as a rule to be handled in a 
legal manner by lawyers and legal scholars? Or, put differently, what are 
the more specific ramifications of analyzing a class of market directives as 
“law” and suggesting that these market principles be understood as central 
to the global legal order? Even if this discursive move is plausible, is it 
desirable? 
This Part argues that understanding how market givens can act as a 
type of law would open them up to an important range of criticism and 
 
 144. As Benedict Kingsbury points out, “concepts of law may have political significance. . . . The choice 
among such approaches is a political choice with political implications.” Kingsbury, supra note 137, at 26; see 
Benedict Kingsbury, Legal Positivism as Normative Politics: International Society, Balance of Power and 
Lassa Oppenheim’s Positive International Law, 13 Eur. J. Int’l L. 401 (2002). 
 145. Andrea Bianchi, On Power and Illusion: The Concept of Transparency in International Law, in 
Transparency in International Law 6 (Andrea Bianchi & Anne Peters eds., 2013). 
Lienau-68.3.doc (Do Not Delete) 5/25/2017  8:39 PM 
April 2017]          MARKET PRINCIPLES IN THE GLOBAL LEGAL ORDER 579 
analysis that they might otherwise avoid. This could work in part by 
encouraging lawyers to adopt a more complete understanding of how 
market principles may be among the actual (if not always obvious) rules 
facing themselves and their clients, and so to direct toward them the 
scrutiny and the activism generally accorded to law. Including market 
principles within legal analysis might also contribute to the empirical 
study of such principles, given that lawyers tend to have a distinct 
approach to cases and case studies as compared to social scientists. In 
addition, this shift could place pressure on normatively problematic 
market principles by encouraging their assessment against value 
frameworks associated with lawincluding frameworks of legitimate 
rulemaking, accountability, and the appropriate hierarchy of conflicting 
legal norms. This type of legal scrutiny might undermine the power of 
market principles by fracturing the ideological consensus that supports 
their reputational sanctioning mechanisms. Finally, this Part turns to the 
possible risk involved in labeling market principles as law, in particular 
the risk of granting them a degree of legitimacy that they do not 
necessarily deserve. Ultimately, because of the very different kind of 
norm entrepreneurship likely to be associated with support for market 
principles, I contend that this risk does not outweigh the likely benefits 
of thinking about market principles as part of the legal order. 
A. Broadening the Lawyer’s Field of Vision 
Thus far, I have spoken fairly generally about the need to direct 
toward market principles the same scrutiny and analysis accorded to law 
as it is more conventionally understood. But what might this kind of 
application or scrutiny look like? To begin with the obvious, lawyers tend 
to study, practice, and criticize law. And the identification of something 
as law triggers several important questions: How does this fit into the 
constellation of other laws or rules in this area? Who is the lawmaker for 
this rule? Is the lawmaker properly authorized and accountable? And, if 
we are dissatisfied with the rule in question, how might it be changed? 
H.L.A. Hart emphasized the key connection in any legal order between 
primary rules, which can direct action and guide conductfor example, 
“stop at a red light”and secondary rules, which include the procedures 
for making, modifying, or enforcing those rules.146 This analysis does not 
 
 146. See generally H.L.A Hart, The Concept of Law 91–99 (3d ed. 2012). Of course Hart himself seems 
not to have characterized “law” as existing in the absence of “a union of primary rules of obligation with such 
secondary rules,” which are not immediately apparent in market principles. Id. at 94. Still, part of the 
argument is to suggest that market principles can map onto many of these more generally accepted modes of 
legal analysesand that such mapping would illuminate our understanding of how they workeven if the 
analytical frameworks may need to be modified somewhat. See Mehrdad Payandeh, The Concept of 
International Law in the Jurisprudence of H.L.A. Hart, 21 Eur. J. Int’l L. 967 (2010) (providing an analysis 
that applies Hart’s jurisprudence to international law as it is more generally understood today). 
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smoothly translate to market principles, which are not chosen as law by a 
clearly identifiable actor. The primary rules can be difficult to discern, 
and identifying or thinking through secondary rulesincluding the 
procedures for changing these market principlesmight be even more 
difficult. 
Still, a good lawyer should comprehend the full constellation of 
rules relevant to a given issue area. If market principles are indeed acting 
as a type of under-identified law in the global arena, then this kind of 
analysis is necessary for a more complete understanding of the actual 
rules shaping actor behavior and distributional outcomes. Identifying 
primary rules for market principles may require a degree of uncovering, 
as previously demonstrated by the examples in Part I. But this project of 
explicit identification is more likely to happen if lawyers and legal 
scholars start to conceive of market principles as part of the field of law 
itself. Along these lines, an initial mapping or identification of the 
relevant rules for an issue area might start by asking: What are the 
formal rules, including those hard law rules understood according to 
traditional doctrines or sources? In addition, what are the informal or 
soft law rules, whether they are generated by public or private authority? 
And also, what are the relevant market principlescollective beliefs 
about how markets work, as an ostensibly objective matterthat 
themselves generate or imply directives for actors? It seems that this may 
already happen informally in many arenas. For example, returning to a 
consideration of the rules governing capital mobility, we might first look 
at the IMF Articles of Agreement, which clearly allow governments to 
limit the convertibility of capital accounts, as I discuss in Part I.B. But 
any advisor that stopped here would rightly be accused of a formalistic 
misunderstanding of the actually existing rules on the ground. The actual 
rule on capital mobility might include, at a given moment, a market 
principle that effectively blocks or sanctions capital controls, 
notwithstanding the countervailing hard law technically on the books. 
In response to any claims about the inevitability or special strength of 
this market principle, a savvy lawyer might have her doubts. She may well 
share the fairly obvious, commonsense background knowledge that one 
period’s objective market principle (and one era’s objective knowledge of 
any sort) is likely to be historically contingent, socially constructed, and 
eventually overturned. But, so long as we accept that market principles 
remain primarily the provenance of other disciplineseconomics, 
economic sociology, and perhaps political sciencethat background 
knowledge does not translate out of the recesses of the lawyerly mind into 
the foreground, where it might have a more substantial impact on one’s 
work in the legal world. 
And what kind of impact might that be? A wise legal advisor, 
recognizing and interpreting the full array of primary rules in a particular 
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issue area, will probably recommend technically complying with the 
rules, or at least will ensure a full understanding of the consequences of a 
violation, regardless of whether those rules take the form of hard law, 
soft law, or market principles. But a sophisticated and long-term advocate 
for a particular client or for a particular viewpoint probably should not 
stop there. An additional step might be to take the perspective of an 
aspiring law-changer as well, which is of course a kind of norm 
entrepreneur (or, to use a less flattering term, a lobbyistindeed, the 
overlap between lobbyists and lawyers can hardly be an accident). The 
analytical consequence is then to ask: If a particular rule, including a 
particular market principle, does not fall in line with my preferred position, 
how might it be changed? Who are the relevant lawmakers here, both the 
obvious ones and those working behind the scenes? What are the 
underlying economic and political structures that prevent a modification 
of the rule, and how might those be dealt with? These inquiries, a type of 
directed investigation into certain secondary rules, should be relevant 
regardless of the kind of law or rule under investigation. 
Of course, identifying the lawmakers and the underlying constraining 
structures for a given law or rule is never easy, and it certainly would not 
be any easier for market principles understood as law. Furthermore, this 
goal points to questions of power, politics, and the development of 
organizational expertise and processesquestions central to disciplines 
other than law, in particular that of political science. But law and lawyers 
have always used these insights for their own purposes, turning to the 
social sciences in furtherance of lawyerly goals and folding those insights 
into legal projects, including the project of identifying and targeting 
levers for change. 
B. Another Empirical Look at Market Principles 
Still, is the legal field only drawing from these other disciplines or 
can it also offer something to empirical study? In my view, the project of 
identifying the underlying social construction and historical contingency 
of market principles, which is of interest to certain variants of social 
science, could use the eyes of a lawyerly advocate as well. This is 
particularly the case because, during certain periods in the social science 
disciplines, the greatest rewards have gone to those focused on developing 
broadly applicable explanatory theories. This trend has tended to include 
an emphasis on parsimonious explanationthose explanations capable of 
explaining a large amount of data with a relatively simple theory and fewer 
assumptions.147 Although this approach to theory development has 
 
 147. See Jack S. Levy, Explaining Events and Developing Theories: History, Political Science, and the 
Analysis of International Relations, in Bridges and Boundaries: Historians, Political Scientists, and the 
Study of International Relations 39–84 (Colin Elman & Miriam Fendius Elman eds., 2001) (discussing 
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produced incredibly important work, it can also encourage or prefer 
methodologies and findings that emphasize regularities instead of 
anomalies. And market principles, of course, can be understood as a type 
of parsimonious explanation of how markets regularly work, with 
embedded directives for actor behavior. These market givens can thus 
derive validation from particular social science frameworks, and any 
tendency within social science to reward findings of market principles 
may inadvertently bolster them as seemingly inevitable. In privileging 
research geared toward regularities, such an approach in the social 
sciences might overlook the information that could be mined from a 
closer consideration of anomalous and exceptional casesinformation 
about how a regularity or rule was made or reinforced in the first place, 
through the work of particular actors or the impact of specific ideational 
and material structures. These studies may thus neglect information 
about potential levers for eventually changing that rule. 
By contrast, legal work tends to be attuned not only to understanding 
the map of legal rules for an issue, but also to actively finding and 
investigating the cases that seem to be an exception to the rule, or that 
suggest the possibility of an alternative, inchoate rule that might better 
serve a preferred position. An anomalous case is valuable precisely 
because it is the exception and, as such, provides insight into the set of 
principles and perhaps the constellation of interests that support a 
surprising outcome in a particular case. At least for this mode of legal 
analysis and advocacy, the goal is not only to recognize and apply the 
laws but also to understandand perhaps to challengethe conceptual 
and material apparatus supporting one outcome rather than another. 
Especially given research trends in the social sciences, then, greater 
attention by lawyers to how market principles act as law could thus 
enrich not only the lawyer’s own understanding of the global legal order 
but also provide empirical insights relevant to international economic 
relations more generally. A full understanding of market principles is 
important enough to deserve close analysis through multiple disciplinary 
lenses and could benefit significantly from an advocacy mindset. 
C. Questions of Lawmaking, Accountability, and 
Value Congruence 
Furthermore, attention by lawyers to market principles can also raise 
important normative questions about accountability and value congruence 
that have been relegated to the sidelines of other disciplines.148 The 
 
how these methodological issues concerning historical developments are approached in history and political 
science); id. at 54–58 (discussing the methodological issues in particularly thorough detail). 
 148. This is not to say that law is “inherently moral,” and indeed any general theoretical discussion of 
normativity in the legal sphere is fraught. New Essays on the Normativity of Law (Stefano Bertea & 
Lienau-68.3.doc (Do Not Delete) 5/25/2017  8:39 PM 
April 2017]          MARKET PRINCIPLES IN THE GLOBAL LEGAL ORDER 583 
identification of a phenomenon or rule as legal tends to trigger important 
scrutiny not only about who the lawmaker is or how the law has 
developed, but also about whether the law (and perhaps the lawmaker) is 
actually appropriate or fully deserving of respect and adherence. Rule 
forms including soft or informal law have recently been scrutinized along 
these lines, following upon the expanded scope of international law 
discussed in Part II.A. For example, a volume focused on informal 
international law has sought to “draw attention to a phenomenon that is 
omnipresent in global governance, and yet seems largely neglected by 
international lawyers.”149 The project was motivated by the Hague Institute 
for the Internationalisation of Law’s request for a study on the question of 
“[h]ow forms of informal international public policy-making can be made 
more democratic and accountable.”150 The standards for judgment in this 
type of legal scrutiny vary depending on the analyst, but recent analyses 
have drawn from the approaches of global administrative law and 
international public authority, for example.151 
Of course, market principles do not benefit from having more or 
less identifiable rulemakers who deliberately select guidelines, which 
would be helpful in asking questions about accountability and legitimacy. 
Still, it should be possible to think through who actually develops, 
formulates, and transmits a given market principle, and to think through 
where this process could be most subject to pressure. Such a project is 
distinct from that of this Article, but some preliminary questions and 
qualifications are worth raising. One temptation might be to challenge 
(or dismiss) the social science disciplines whose models and findings can 
come to be understood as market principles. But this would hardly be 
warranted or useful, particularly as a central virtue of these fields is their 
explicit interest in challenging and falsifying the causal beliefs and 
explanations proposed by others. More importantly, as Ngaire Woods 
points out in her study of the IMF and World Bank, there are problems 
with any suggestion that “a new and better Washington consensus applied 
by the institutions could rectify their alleged wrongdoing . . . . What they 
do is not just a product of how good their economics is or isn’t.”152 And 
although this points to politics and power in thinking through the 
development of market principles, it is important not to oversimplify on 
 
George Pavlakos eds., 2011) (providing an example of a relatively recent volume that covers several 
strands of legal philosophy on the general topic). 
 149. Informal International Lawmaking, supra note 134, at 1. 
 150. Id. at 2. Also see Chris Brummer’s discussion of similar issues in international financial law as 
“soft law.” Brummer, supra note 133, at 327, 337–42. 
 151. See, e.g., Benedict Kingsbury et al., The Emergence of Global Administrative Law, 68 Law & 
Contemp. Probs. 15 (2005); Armin von Bogdandy et al., From Public International to International Public 
Law: Translating World Public Opinion into International Public Authority (Working Paper, Sept. 18, 
2015), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2662391. 
 152. Ngaire Woods, The Globalizers: The IMF, the World Bank, and their Borrowers 2 (2006). 
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this front eitherthough it is never wrong to say “power matters,” it is 
also rarely especially insightful.153 
Instead, for any particular market principle, more fine-grained 
questions about bureaucracies, political institutions, market structures, 
ideational frameworks, expert and epistemic communities, and individual 
actors may all be relevant to different degrees.154 The constellation of 
pertinent features will likely be unique to any given rule, though there 
could also be common themes and actorsthe international financial 
institutions, credit rating agencies, and other formal and informal 
governance bodies, for example. Indeed, this dynamic of specificity and 
commonality should already be familiar from case studies of hard and 
soft law in a number of international economic areas.155 Furthermore, 
many of these institutions are already under study by legal scholars, 
including many of those scholars discussed in Part IV of this Article. The 
goal here is to enlarge that realm of study to include an investigation not 
only of pressure points and possible accountability mechanisms for 
explicitly selected guidelines, but also of how to translate these questions 
to the processes by which market principles are adopted and emerge as 
directives for actor behavior. 
In addition to considerations of lawmaking and accountability, 
scrutiny by lawyers and legal scholars would likely involve analytical 
frameworks that raise normatively inflected questions about rule conflict 
and value congruence. For example, international law scholarship has 
focused significantly on questions of norm hierarchy and on the difficulty 
of reconciling rules that emerge out of disparate or fragmented legal 
regimes and institutions.156 This focus on hierarchy and on the question of 
 
 153. For a discussion of the role and meaning of power and interest in norm construction, with a 
focus on the sovereign debt context, see Lienau, supra note 35, at 15–17. 
 154. This Article’s goal is not to lay out a comprehensive view or general theory of where market 
principles come from or how they change, which would be an impossible task (not to mention antithetical 
to the general spirit of my argument). As should be clear from the capital controls and debt continuity 
examples, the mechanisms by which particular market principles are initially constructed or transform can 
vary significantly. Certain market principles may develop, solidify, or change fairly slowly, involving 
generational shifts of ideas or relatively gradual changes in underlying market structure. Sovereign debt 
continuity, perhaps, provides an example along these lines. Others may alter more quickly, reflecting a 
change in the expert opinions or bureaucratic structures central to idea generation in a given area, as 
seems to have been the case with capital controls in the late 1980s through the early 2000s. Just as with the 
development of any other type of law, then, both political agency and broader structural issues are very 
likely to be part of the picture in any instance of the development and change of market principles. 
 155. For example, see the cases considered in Informal International Lawmaking, supra note 134. 
 156. Other legal scholarship that could be relevant in this context discusses the phenomenon of 
fragmentationthe development of multiple legal issues, institutions, and norms, which may overlap but 
which operate independently and potentially according to separate logics. There is significant disagreement 
about how to characterize fragmentation and also about the degree to which this is problematic. But it does 
seem that the analytical framework of fragmentation has helped to shed light on an array of specialized or 
individualized legal regimes that otherwise might receive little consideration. Margaret Young provides an 
excellent annotated bibliography sketching the contours of scholarly debate in Fragmentation, in Oxford 
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which rule takes precedence in the event of a conflict is very much 
central to the practice of law. As Martti Koskenniemi highlights, “[l]egal 
reason is a hierarchical form of reason, establishing relationships of 
inferiority and superiority” between rules and between sources of law or 
levels of authority.157 Of course, there is disagreement about whether this 
characterization is appropriate at the international level, and certainly 
about what a hierarchy of legal sources or principles might actually look 
like.158 While many scholars and some international bodies have embraced 
the idea of superior or peremptory norms (jus cogens), particularly in regard 
to human rights obligations, neither state actions nor the decisions of 
adjudicative bodies have offered an especially strong endorsement.159 But, as 
Dinah Shelton points out in her centennial essay on norm hierarchy for the 
American Journal of International Law, “[p]erhaps the most significant 
positive aspect of this trend toward normative hierarchy is its reaffirmation 
of the link between law and ethics, in which law is one means to achieve the 
fundamental values of an international society.”160 It is certainly the case 
that this analytical framework, and in particular the attempt to 
conceptually organize various autonomous international legal regimes into 
possible norm hierarchies, has significantly impacted what legal scholars 
study and how practicing lawyers make normative claims.161 
If we conceive of market principles as a type of global law requiring 
analysis by lawyers, how might this conception fit into the norm 
hierarchy analytical framework? Such an approach would likely ask 
whether the rules embedded in market principles cohere or conflict with 
other standards in the global legal system. For example, if the rule 
embedded in a particular market principlefor example, the rule of 
sovereign debt continuityconflicts with emerging international rules, 
such as peremptory norms of human rights, is this a problem? In regard 
to the sovereign debt continuity situation, we have reached a point where 
we can now imagine prosecuting, or at least condemning, the leaders of a 
fallen regime for crimes against a state’s population while simultaneously 
expecting that same population to acknowledge and repay the fallen 
 
Bibliographies in International Law (Anthony Carty ed., last modified July 30, 2014), http:// 
www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780199796953/obo-9780199796953-
0113.xml?rskey=cd45Qi&result=2&q=fragmentation#firstMatch . 
 157. Martti Koskenniemi, Hierarchy in International Law: A Sketch, 8 Eur. J. Int’l L. 566, 566 (1997); 
see Dinah Shelton, Normative Hierarchy in International Law, 100 Am. J. Int’l L. 291, 291 (2006). 
 158. See, e.g., Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Droit International Public 14–16 (6th ed. 2008). 
 159. See, e.g., Shelton, supra note 157, at 292, 294, 297–317. 
 160. Id. at 323. Dupuy notes, of course, the continuing difficulty with how to actually identify 
fundamental values. Id. 
 161. For example, a recent volume considers the hierarchy question in the context of human rights 
obligations across a range of legal regimes. Hierarchy in International Law: The Place of Human Rights 
(Erika de Wet & Jure Vidmar eds., 2012). 
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regime’s debts.162 The basis for condemning the fallen leader might be a 
peremptory norm grounded in respect for human rights. But this respect 
for human rights does not currently translate into the assessment of 
sovereign debt contracts, even if those obligations were entered into in 
order to purchase the military hardware used in the oppression or to 
sustain the regime engaged in the crimes.163  
This is of course an extreme hypothetical, and there would remain 
the technical difficulty of actually pinpointing such funds and also 
identifying the breadth of any potentially relevant jus cogens norm. But 
currently this incongruence tends not to come up at all, despite the 
existence of general calls to attend to human rights as a fundamental 
legal principle in all areas, including the international economic arena.164 
Still, this inattention is entirely reasonable so long as we conceive of debt 
continuity as simply an objective economic constraint. With the 
assumption of an objective constraint, the problematic outcome may be 
unfortunate and even immoral, but is largely inevitable due to “market 
reality”and thus less likely to be part of core debates in international 
law. But if debt continuity is a contingent legal rule and understood to be 
part of global law, then this disconnect with a potential jus cogens norm 
is a problem of inconsistency that deserves the attention of practicing 
lawyers and legal scholars. 
D. Fracturing Reputational Consensus 
This is not at all to say that increased scrutiny and questions about 
lawmaking, accountability, or normative congruence will immediately 
change market principles that might be considered problematic. Nor is it 
to suggest that active supporters or beneficiaries of a market principle in 
a particular situation will have a change of heart and adopt alternative 
viewpoints on this basis. Furthermore, there is not likely to be any 
adjudication in which market principles clearly win out over (or lose to) 
other rules. However, as detailed in the capital controls and debt 
continuity examples previously discussed, market principles are 
effectively enforced or lose power through the mechanism of reputation 
and the subsequent narrowing or opening of policy space for state actors. 
And if market principles work through reputation rather than through 
traditional sanctions, this provides an opportunity for scrutiny and 
discussion to have some impact. 
 
 162. See Lienau, supra note 35, at 227. 
 163. Of course the debt may nonetheless be cancelled under the circumstances, at least if it is held by 
public creditors. But any such cancellation would be characterized as charity on the part of creditors, and not 
as an act necessitated or mandated by overarching human rights norms and by a related understanding of 
inherent limits on state borrowing. 
 164. See, e.g., Shelton, supra note 157, at 294 (noting relevant quotations and citing relevant sources). 
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A useful illustration can be provided by returning to the example of 
capital mobility. The imposition of controls in one period (t1perhaps 
1945 through the mid-1980s) may have been considered unfortunate 
from the perspective of some international investors but would still have 
been accepted as a generally prudent and careful economic policy, 
resulting in only a relatively mild reputational sanction, if any. But not 
long after (in t2perhaps late 1980s through the early 2000s), the 
imposition of capital controls was read as a heterodox challenge to 
market norms due to a different belief about how markets work, and 
thus interpreted as an act deserving of greater reputational censure. In 
short, it seems that the specific action of imposing controlswhich 
remained identicaldid not really trigger the sanction. Nor was there a 
change in the official hard law, which remained the same, as discussed in 
Part I.B. Rather, the sanction was triggered by the fact that, by the t2 time 
period, the meaning various actors ascribed to a state’s decision to 
impose controls had changed. At this later moment, such behavior was 
read as a rule violation rather than a mere policy preference, due to the 
shifted market principle. 
So how does this relate to the possible impact of greater attention 
from international law? The power of a given market principle rests in 
part on the expectation that a particular act will be interpreted as 
inappropriate and that the subsequent reputational response will be 
largely inevitable. This bolsters its rule-like character and covers over the 
fact that the ostensibly inevitable market rule may have been starkly 
different not so long ago. But bringing market principles within the 
conceptual ambit of legal rules and then treating them as 
suchhighlighting how these market principles shift and are likely to have 
been politically constructed, asking about the appropriateness of 
lawmakers, identifying and problematizing inconsistencies with other 
international normscan weaken the mystique of these market givens and 
can also undermine any sense that a “violation” will uniformly be 
considered inappropriate. In addition, to the extent that a state action can 
be framed as reasonablenot a violation of unambiguous rules but 
perhaps a balancing of multiple potential rulesthe likelihood of a strong 
and broad reputational response to any violation should be lower.165 The 
 
 165. This is particularly true given that any reputational response is likely to be mediated through 
perceptions of a state’s negotiations with or statements to international actors, including international 
financial institutions or investors, in conjunction with any policy action. As is well-studied in international 
relations, negotiations by sovereign states can be understood as a two-level game. See generally Robert D. 
Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games, 42 Int’l Org. 427 (1988) 
(providing a classic version of this discussion). The state makes representations to international partners 
about what will be domestically acceptable, just as it makes representations to domestic constituents and 
interest groups about what is achievable on the international level. Any background discussion that 
impacts the perception of how the other party’s audience is likely to react may impact the strategic 
thinking around these negotiations. 
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capital controls example suggests that, holding the actual state behavior 
constant, a reading of the state as a recalcitrant violator of clear rules will 
result in a higher sanction. Similarly, if the demands made by international 
actors negotiating with a state seem unreasonable in light of questions 
about market principle objectivity and normative appropriateness, they 
may feel pressure to modify their position. 
This multifaceted presentation hardly provides a clear theory of how 
attention by international law could have an immediate impact. However, 
it arguably maps more accurately onto the ways in which market principles 
worknot through win/lose adjudications, but rather in negotiations, 
broader audience perceptions, and subsequent reputational effects. In the 
sovereign debt continuity case, the example of the Iraqi debt negotiations 
after the fall of Saddam Hussein may be relevant. On the one hand, there 
were reasonable arguments to be made that some of the debt incurred by 
the fallen regime was problematic and should be cancelled. On the other, a 
unilateral debt cancellation by the Iraqi government would have been 
viewed as unacceptable and would likely have resulted in reputational 
consequences. Lee Buchheit, the lead negotiator for the new Iraqi regime, 
had the following to say on the background popular discussions of 
illegitimate or odious debt, even though the argument was never raised in 
the negotiating room itself: 
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[The issue] was definitely presentthe atmospherics are unavoidable. The 
creditors all dealt with Saddam, and now half castigated him as Beelzebub. 
But repudiation or full payment was not a binary choice in the negotiating 
context. . . . If we have reached a point where we could legitimately make a 
claim on odious debt, then they’re already softened up.166 
Determining when one can “legitimately make a claim,” and arguing 
that such a claim is reasonable and supported by at least some swathe of 
the global audience, is precisely the bailiwick of the international legal 
community. All this is to say that greater international legal scrutiny of 
market principles may have an impact in several related ways: by 
questioning the seeming clarity or objectivity of those principles and 
emphasizing that they are manmade; by asking about the normative 
appropriateness of the concomitant rules; and by altering or softening the 
interpretations (and reputational consequences) of a state actor as a 
recalcitrant violator. Thus, the reputational mechanism itselfthe 
intrinsically interactive way that market principles are enforcedprovides 
an avenue by which conceiving of these market principles as law and 
bringing them into the ambit of international legal work may have an 
impact. 
E. The Risk of Inadvertent Legitimation 
Even if there are significant potential benefits to incorporating 
market principles into our understanding of the global legal order, are 
there also risks involved? In particular, actors and scholars sometimes 
seek to label a body of rules as “law” in an effort to cloak it with a type 
of legal legitimacy, and perhaps even to have that legitimacy secured or 
confirmed by courts or other decisionmakers. This may be the case for 
civil society activists or norm entrepreneurs seeking to deepen or 
enshrine a particular moral or political idea through a legal form. It can 
also be the case for business entities, which might want to see 
controversies settled according to their own business customs, tagged an 
emergent lex mercatoria and freed from national regulations that they 
would rather disregard. Indeed, the potential distributional ramifications 
of such efforts at legitimation through legal labeling are hardly lost on 
critics. For example, Stephen Toope has argued that “the so-called lex 
mercatoria is largely an effort to legitimise as ‘law’ the economic interests 
of Western corporations.”167 
Although this type of legitimation is certainly part of the impetus for 
some projects of law-expansion, that is far from the goal of this Article. I 
 
 166. Lienau, supra note 35, at 214 (quoting Author’s Interview with Lee C. Buchheit, Partner, Cleary, 
Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton, in New York City, New York (Sept. 23, 2008)). 
 167. Stephen J. Toope, Mixed International Arbitration: Studies in Arbitration Between States 
and Private Persons 96 (1990). 
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do not at all suggest that courts or other decisionmaking actors should 
grant these market givens even more legal power than they already have. 
Despite their law-like character, it would be hard to characterize them as 
broadly legitimate, worthy of further respect and elevation; indeed, these 
market principles have not been vetted according to any standard of 
legitimate lawmaking.168 While there is no need to engage in the thorny 
debates of whether any inherent link exists between law and morality or 
law and legitimacyespecially in light of the broad “family resemblance” 
understanding of law adopted in this Article169it seems clear that we 
characterize and study a range of rules and directives as law even though 
they are morally or politically problematic. As such, understanding the 
rules embedded in market principles as part of the global legal world 
does not automatically render them worthy of approbation or court 
application. However, as detailed more fully in the previous Subparts, it 
can help direct toward these market givens the scholarly attention, 
critical questioning, and heightened scrutiny generally accorded to law. 
Still, to what degree can we really draw such lines or barriers 
between the different possible ramifications of labeling? Is it possible to 
identify a class of rules as a type of “law” while denying it the legitimacy 
frequently (though not uniformly) accorded to the category? There may 
be hazards involved in any project of categorization, and reasonable 
concerns exist about giving up on more traditionalist state-based 
understandings of law. But market principles seem less prone to the risk 
of inadvertent legitimation or approbation, in particular because they are 
not positioned as normative or legal claims in the first place. Indeed, they 
are promoted (if promotion is the right word) by a very different kind of 
entrepreneurship than one usually imagines when thinking of norm 
advocacy. The more common or cognizable type of legal-normative 
entrepreneurship might involve a re-characterization of already present 
normative ideas into more comprehensibly legal language. As Bianchi 
points out in the case of transparency, “[n]ormative concepts and 
prescriptions of a varied nature may exercise significant influence on 
international legal processes regardless of their formal status. Such 
concepts are often translated into law by means of ‘principles’ . . . in the 
sense of normative prescriptions of a general character.”170 Norm 
entrepreneurship may also involve claims about law as part of a very 
 
 168. This sets aside for now the fact that conceptions of legitimacy are hard to pin down, particularly in 
the international arena. See generally Odette Lienau, The Challenge of Legitimacy in Sovereign Debt 
Restructuring, 57 Harv. Int’l L.J. 151 (2016) (providing further discussion on the difficulty of conceptualizing 
legitimacy in the sovereign debt context). 
 169. See discussion of “family resemblance” concept of law supra Part II, text associated with notes 
128–130. 
 170. Bianchi, supra note 145, at 6. 
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explicit legal policy project, as in the case of the landmine ban.171 Here, 
the proffered norm is presented as morally or politically superior to the 
status quo, and as better according with the underlying identities or 
values of the actors in questionincluding values enshrined in law, such 
as the value of protecting innocent life or respecting human rights.  
Although the broad adoption of market principles may well take 
significant entrepreneurship, it is of a very different sort than that relevant 
for an issue like the landmine ban. In particular, those in favor of a given 
market principlefor example, debt continuity or free capital 
mobilitywould likely not consider themselves to be advocates for a 
particular, changeable law. Indeed, there may be very good reasons for 
market principles to remain, so to speak, in hiding from law. This is 
because, to anthropomorphize somewhat, perhaps the ultimate goal for all 
laws, norms, or collective beliefs (and their respective entrepreneurs) is to 
achieve a kind of taken-for-granted status, with the air of unchangeability 
it confers. For an openly principled rule such as a prohibition against 
slavery or against using a technology such as landmines or chemical 
weapons, an explicit legal obligation can formalize and enshrine a 
collective belief as being in line with core values of the relevant 
community. Such formalization also serves as a clear and deliberate 
decision to reject previous (and presumably less enlightened) rules of 
international engagement, at least in theory, and can even act as a 
marker in historical narratives of legal progress.172 Compliance with the 
rule ideally becomes the appropriate and assumed choice in any given 
circumstance, even if material consequences or instrumental thinking 
might recommend in favor of violating the rule.173 
But for a collective belief such as a market principle, which purports 
to narrate how markets function as an objective matter, the relationship 
with a legal or political institution can be more problematic. To achieve 
ultimate taken-for-grantedness, the consequences of violating this kind of 
rule should, perhaps, not be seen to emanate from something so banal and 
mortal as an identifiable political institution or legal body promulgating or 
enforcing chosen (and therefore challengeable) policies. Rather, the 
consequences of violating the expectations implicated by a market 
principle should ideally be seen to result from unchanging and objective 
economic constraints. To the extent that a market principle can be 
 
 171. This example is mentioned briefly in the discussion of constructivism infra Part IV.B. 
 172. Such narratives have, of course, come under considerable scholarly pressure. See, e.g., Antony 
Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law (2007). 
 173. Constructivists might also focus on the possibility that such rules, collective beliefs, and values 
can impact actors’ interests by shaping their identities, such that these actors would consider a violation of 
that rule to be contrary to not just their interest but also their identity (be it personal or collective). For an 
overview of key themes in constructivism, see infra text associated with notes 188–189 (offering key 
examples of constructivist scholarship). 
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maintained without any explicit legal groundwork, it may ultimately and 
counterintuitively command greater adherence and be viewed as more 
legitimate than other deliberately legalized norms. Again, this dynamic 
of escaping (or failing to seek) legal characterization does not at all 
diminish the fact that these market principles may perform legal work, in 
terms of generating implicit but well-understood rules or by pre-selecting 
focal points for other legalized forms and undergirding reputational 
enforcement mechanisms. Indeed, remaining in the shadows of law may 
even allow this legal work to be more effective. This is precisely why 
legal scrutiny is important for those market principles considered 
normatively problematic. 
Thus, even if market principles were conceived of as part of lawand 
therefore ultimately as a politically constructed and changeable set of 
rulesthe risk of inadvertent legitimation seems minimal given that 
advocates of a particular market principle would be unlikely to endorse 
this conception. The publicity necessary for any effort to promote external 
recognition as law would not only give lie to the idea of these market 
principles as objective, but also raise questions about their provenance and 
legal legitimacy. This is not to say that advocates of a market idea will not 
sometimes make the effort to move toward formalization as hard or soft 
law. It is possible that certain groups may consider formal legalization to 
offer a valuable additional layer of obligation and controlfor example, 
if they believe that the reputational enforcement of a market principle is 
insufficient incentive to ensure compliance. One instance of this might be 
the effort within the IMF to amend the Articles of Agreement to 
enshrine the principle of capital mobility, as previously discussed in Part 
II.B. But such efforts are no longer law in hiding and, indeed, they can 
expose these market principles to the type of scrutiny and challenge 
appropriately accorded to lawmaking and law-reforming activities. This 
is precisely the type of scrutiny and challenge that should be directed to 
market principles themselves as a more general matter, even if they 
never emerge as deliberately chosen hard or soft law.174 
F. Interacting Rule Forms in the Legal Order 
Despite its focus on market principles, this Article does not intend to 
take away from any general attentiveness to “law on the books,” whether 
those books are formulated by state or non-state actors, and whether the 
laws take the form of binding rules or “soft” principles. Indeed, the 
interaction between market principles and other rule forms will be fairly 
complex for any given issue area, and the analysis in this Article invites 
 
 174. Indeed, this is especially important given that this formalization effort does not always happen. 
Furthermore, these market principles can act in a powerful legal way even in the absence of formalization 
(or as a counter to formalized law). 
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further research into these interactions. For example, under what 
conditions might a market principle actually obviate formal law, as with 
the capital controls example? When might a change in the formal law act 
as a focal point for a change in the rule of the market principle itself? 
And when does the successful enshrinement of a market principle in 
hard law make it stickieras is frequently intended to be the caseand 
therefore more likely to exert influence even after the underlying market 
principle itself has weakened or disappeared? Does the legal design of the 
formal law have an impact on this processfor example, the specificity 
and strength of contractual obligations or the degree of delegation to other 
decision-making bodies? In short, in addition to the empirical study of 
market principles themselves, to which I have already suggested lawyers 
can make a distinct contribution, studies could be done on how those 
principles interact with other rule forms in the legal order. 
The interaction of market principles with other rule forms also 
invites deeper thinking on the policy front. For example, it may be the 
case that market principles can quietly reshape or effectively block and 
render ineffective principles enshrined in other rule forms. In this case, 
actors may exclusively direct (or perhaps misdirect) their efforts and 
scarce resources to these other rule categoriesthrough treaty writing, 
guideline formulation, or doctrinal developmentwhen in fact market 
principles themselves are doing the real work. This leads to the 
questions: When does this dynamic emerge, and what is the best use of 
resources as a result? Given the particular constellation of actors and 
institutions that generate and support a given market principle, what 
should be the target of greater attention? Leaving market principles 
outside our understanding of the global legal order means that these and 
many other questions fail to garner the attention they deserve. 
IV.  The Underinclusiveness of International Legal Theory 
If market principles do indeed play an important role in the global 
legal ordereither directly or through other legal formswhy has 
international law tended to overlook their impact and their potential place 
in our legal-analytical and normative frameworks? Especially given the 
recently expanded understandings of “international law,” it is perhaps 
surprising that international legal scholarship has not given market 
principles more focused attention. The absence of such inquiry is even 
more puzzling since disciplines cognate to the fieldfor example, certain 
variants of political science and economic sociologyreadily embrace the 
socially and politically constructed nature of market ideas and market 
functioning.175 Indeed, the instability of ostensible market givens, and even 
 
 175. For examples of scholarship in cognate disciplines that embrace the constructed nature of markets, 
see, among others, Constructing the International Economy (Rawi Abdelal et al. eds., 2010); On 
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some of the mechanisms by which they vary, should not sound especially 
new to anyone familiar with this literature. And much of the international 
legal scholarship over the last several decades that sought to expand the 
boundaries of traditional law has very explicitly embraced interdisciplinarity. 
One reason for the relative absence of market principles in our 
understanding of the global legal order may lie in their epistemological 
facadethey are frequently framed and received as descriptive, factual 
observations that lead to accepted best practices. As such, their ultimately 
manmade and rule-like character can be difficult to identify. But the 
omission might also result from tendencies within international legal 
scholarship itselfin particular, the tendency of much international legal 
scholarship to focus on rule forms that are deliberately chosen by state, 
sub-state, or non-state actors. These rules may be more or less formal and 
more or less strongly enforced, but legal scholars have tended to define 
“law”even in the expanded version discussed in Part II.Aas 
including only those directives that actors knowingly select as rules or 
guidelines. Thus, international lawyers can accept without difficulty a key 
insight from cognate disciplinesnamely, that market ideas are 
politically and socially constructed. But because these market ideas are 
not presented as rules or laws, their constructedness does not necessarily 
challenge how lawyers understand their functioning in the legal world. 
And scholars from cognate disciplines may be very interested in the 
construction of market givens themselves, but miss their translation into 
legal activity and legal modes of analysisor perhaps, as with Michel 
Callon, tend to use “law” largely as a metaphor.176 
As such, this Part looks more closely at international legal theory 
itself, and considers some of the reasons why market givens have failed 
to enter our understanding of global law thus far. The assumed centrality 
of deliberate choice in law is true of theoretical approaches that posit 
states as rational actors working to secure their own interests, but it is also 
true to an important degree even for frameworks drawn from 
constructivist theory, which explicitly seeks to demonstrate how broader 
normative principles and beliefs may shape actor interests and identities. 
Some variants of these approaches even assume a hierarchy in the strength 
of legal formsthe idea that there is a legal continuum involving 
beliefs/norms, custom, soft law, and then hard lawand may also assume 
that rule advocates will want to move up this hierarchy to render their 
preferred standard more powerful, with the caveat that occasionally a 
“lesser” form of law can better represent underlying goals. Critical 
international law scholars perhaps come closest, emphasizing the 
 
Capitalism (Victor Nee & Richard Swedberg eds., 2007); Monetary Orders: Ambiguous Economics, 
Ubiquitous Politics, supra note 17; Laws of the Market, supra note 143; Abdelal, supra note 55; 
Chwieroth, supra note 55. 
 176. Laws of the Market, supra note 143. 
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important role of knowledge practices in constituting the content, 
boundaries, and distributional ramifications of law. But they have 
neglected to focus directly on the shared attributes of market principles 
as a class, and their framing of such beliefs and knowledge frameworks as 
impacting law (rather than as a type of law itself) paradoxically presses 
these insights to the margins of international legal studies. 
Given this range of orientations, it seems natural that international 
legal theory would tend to overlook the real impact that market 
principles can have, and also to miss the way in which they may actually 
benefit from escaping the label “law.” In other words, the assumption 
that beliefs such as market principles work largely outside the global 
legal system can counterintuitively render them even more powerful 
within the law, allowing them to act while avoiding the questions about 
coherence and accountability that we associate with the legal system. 
A. Rational Choice and Options in Law 
International legal theory has moved through several waves 
following World War II, after which lawyers worked to construct new 
global rules and institutions that might prevent future chaos. These 
international lawyers tended toward a positivism that promoted formally 
binding legal obligations for states, hoping that such rigidity would 
provide the best chance of stability going forward. Dominant thinkers in 
the field of international relations, however, discounted the importance 
of such legal mechanisms, considering them an outgrowth ofand 
epiphenomenal tothe fundamentally unchanging state goals of 
preserving security and maximizing power.177 These scholars working in 
the post-war realist tradition contended that the idealist vision of a law-
based world order would fail to deliver the desired peace, and might 
even destabilize global relations, due to its naive assumptions about the 
possible depth of interstate cooperation. 
Central to the reconciliation of these views has been the rise of 
rational choice approaches focused on the ways in which international 
institutions may serve state ends. This rationalist institutionalist 
framework, at least in its earlier forms, tended to accept the realist 
assumptions of a unitary state acting in its own predetermined interests. 
But it contended that such interests might nonetheless coincide with 
 
 177. The classic post-World War II text on political realism is Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among 
Nations (1948). Drawing from this tradition, George W. Downs, David M. Rocke, and Peter N. Barsoom 
cast doubt on the real meaning of compliance in Is the Good News About Compliance Good News About 
Cooperation? 50 Int’l Org. 379, 406 (1996). Jack Goldsmith and Eric Posner offer an update on certain 
elements of this realist take, suggesting that customary international law is simply a series of behavioral 
regularities accompanied by “law-talk” to signal future intentions to continue the behavior. For a recent 
iteration, see generally Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, The Limits of International Law (2005). 
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those of other states and thus pave the way for cooperation.178 Interstate 
interaction in this model is not necessarily zero-sum, with a clear winner 
and loser, but rather can enhance the welfare of all actors if coordination 
and defection problems are overcome. Once states select and establish 
an institution or set of rules, it shapes state behavior and further 
incentivizes cooperation by altering the costs and rewards of given 
choices. However, the institutions and rules themselves are established to 
serve states’ long-run interests, and they are adhered to so long as those 
interests appear to be promoted. 
International law scholars working within this broad rationalist 
approach have expanded both the range of institutional choice and the 
actors under study, all while remaining within a paradigm that 
understands law as a deliberately chosen endeavor. To begin with, they 
have expanded the legal forms under consideration, moving away from 
any assumption that stringent obligations are necessarily optimal and 
highlighting how states can select among a number of institutional forms 
in response to different foreign policy goals.179 For example, Kenneth 
Abbott and Duncan Snidal noted that, while states may opt into hard law 
legalization, they might also “choose softer forms of legalized 
governance when those forms offer superior institutional solutions.”180 
Pursuing this theme of a continuum in legal form and commitment 
capacity from which actors may select, Andrew Guzman suggests that the 
difference between formal treaties, soft law, customary international law, 
and international norms “is a matter of degree rather than kind. Formal 
treaties lie at one end of a spectrum of commitment, with mere norms at 
the other end and customary international law and soft law in 
between.”181 He argues that this categorization corresponds to the likely 
effect that these forms will have on behavior, asserting that it is “possible 
to identify a hierarchy of international law rules, with treaties the most 
likely to affect behavior, norms the least, and soft law and customary 
international law in between[.]”182 Speaking specifically of norms, which 
are at the bottom of this hierarchy, Guzman describes them as “very 
much like [customary international law]they lack explicit consent, are 
unwritten, and are often vague. In addition, they lack the ‘bindingness’ of 
 
 178. See Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political 
Economy (1984) (providing a classic illustration). 
 179. Early on in this scholarly development, the editors of a special issue of the flagship international 
relations journal International Organization posited that “legalization” might vary according to rule 
precision, obligation, and delegation to a third-party decisionmaker. Kenneth W. Abbott et al., The 
Concept of Legalization, 54 Int’l Org. 401, 401 (2000). 
 180. Abbott & Snidal, supra note 26, at 421. 
 181. Guzman, supra note 4, at 9. 
 182. Id. at 214; see id. at 214 fig.6.1. 
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custom. As such, the consequences of failing to honor them, while often 
real, are less than is the case for custom.”183 
While these rational choice scholars do seem to have assumptions 
about legal strength and weakness, this does not lead them to say that the 
strongest legal forms will necessarily be preferable. Early on, Abbot and 
Snidal argued that soft law, while sometimes a step along the route to full 
legalization, can also be “preferable on its own terms. . . . [and] provides 
certain benefits not available under hard legalization.”184 Guzman also 
emphasizes the significant choice available in the range of agreement 
types, including “the decision to adopt a treaty rather than soft law, the 
provision or omission of dispute resolution and monitoring, and the 
inclusion or omission of reservations, escape clauses, and exit clauses.”185 
Further highlighting the deliberately strategic dimension of selecting 
across legal forms, Gregory Shaffer and Mark Pollack note that hard and 
soft law are not necessarily complements but may also act as 
antagoniststhat is, actors can use these forms to obfuscate and to 
undermine arrangements with which they disagree.186 Edward Swaine and 
others have taken rational choice beyond formalized agreements, arguing 
that even customary international law may serve an instrumental purpose 
for states.187 
Although rational choice understandings of international law 
originally tended to posit the state as the main actor, the expansions of 
international law discussed in Part II.A have encompassed an even 
broader range of lawmaking entitiesfrom transgovernmental networks 
to corporations and other non-state entities. But these endeavors still 
 
 183. Id. at 214. As the examples in Part I make clear, this Article suggests that the relationship 
between official “bindingness” and legal effectiveness is more complicated. 
 184. Abbott and Snidal identify the benefits of soft law to include that it is easier to achieve, more 
effective in dealing with uncertainty, and more likely to effectuate compromise. Abbott & Snidal, supra 
note 26, at 423. 
 185. Guzman, supra note 4, at 131. For more on the reasons that states might select soft law, see 
Guzman & Meyer, supra note 26, at 171. For an early cautionary note against oversimplifying the category of 
“soft law,” see C. M. Chinkin, The Challenge of Soft Law: Development and Change in International Law, 
38 Int’l & Comp. L.Q. 850 (1989). 
 186. For Gregory Shaffer and Mark Pollack, the key question on the interaction of hard and soft law is 
“one of specifying the conditions under which actors are likely to employ hard and soft law as alternatives, 
complements, or antagonists.” Gregory C. Shaffer & Mark A. Pollack, Hard vs. Soft Law: Alternatives, 
Complements, and Antagonists in International Governance, 94 Minn. L. Rev. 706, 709 (2010). Kal Raustiala 
criticizes the hard versus soft law terminology but emphasizes the tradeoffs states must choose between in 
making decisions about legality (that is, binding versus nonbinding agreements), substantive deviation from 
the status quo, and structures for monitoring and punishing. Kal Raustiala, Form and Substance in 
International Agreements, 99 Am. J. Int’l L. 581, 582 (2005); see Raustiala, supra note 26, at 3 (noting that 
international lawmakers may have a choice of whether to regulate through formal mechanisms or through 
more informal, network based approaches). All of this resonates with the international rational design 
literature more generally. See, e.g., Koremenos et al., supra note 27.  
 187. Edward T. Swaine, Rational Custom, 52 Duke L.J. 559, 565 (2002) (emphasizing that custom fits 
into rational choice perspectives once we recognize both the broad range and the interdependence of 
strategic games implied by this approach). 
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share in common an idea that some range of rational actors are choosing 
and designing a legal form to best serve their collective interests. This 
literature has thus undermined the strict positivist assumption that only 
binding “real law” agreements do meaningful work while remaining 
within the broader conceptual framework of understanding law as 
chosen, albeit as chosen in different forms to serve multiple types of 
actors. 
B. Aspirational Law in Constructivism 
Even international law scholarship influenced by constructivist 
theory in international relationswhich is very carefully attuned to the 
centrality of collective beliefs and shared understandingshas, perhaps 
surprisingly, often overlooked or under-characterized the multiple ways 
in which market principles can play a part in the global legal order. In 
particular, much of this work, even while rejecting key premises of a 
rationalist framework, has similarly emphasized the deliberate or chosen 
element of norm propagation in international law. It has also sometimes 
accepted the assumptions of a progression or hierarchy from mere shared 
understandings to more concrete forms of lawtending to assume that 
beliefs (to anthropomorphize for a moment) aspire to higher levels of 
formality and publicity. But in fact, as was previously suggested in Part 
III.E, there is reason to think that the legal work done by market 
principles, in terms of pre-selecting plausible policies and encouraging 
compliance through reputational mechanisms, may be more successful if 
the norm or standard itself never becomes interpreted as “legal.” 
In the last twenty years, thinking and writing in international relations 
and international law has been affected significantly by theoretical 
approaches that explicitly emphasize the importance of shared beliefs. 
Speaking very generally, this constructivist turn in international relations 
theory highlights the importance of collective ideas and social norms in 
shaping outcomes in global affairs. It asserts that state and actor interests 
and preferences cannot simply be assumed, and underscores the centrality 
of knowledge and of norms, including those developed through 
international organizations and legal institutions, in constructing state 
interests and even constituting state identities.188 States and other actors in 
this view are motivated not only by an instrumental logic of consequences, 
as in the rationalist approach, but also by a “logic of appropriateness,” 
which considers what would be appropriate or legitimate behavior for an 
 
 188. Several key texts on this approach include: Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International 
Politics (1999); Kratochwil, supra note 141; Martha Finnemore, National Interests in International 
Society (1996); The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (Peter J. 
Katzenstein ed., 1996). This list is hardly exhaustive, of course. 
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actor of a given position or identity in a given social context.189 As such, 
law and legal rules are not merely an outcome or dependent 
variablean end product chosen by parties to facilitate coordination or 
cooperation in service of their predetermined goalsbut rather can be 
understood as part of a dynamic in which states, other actors, and the 
larger institutional and social structures in which they are embedded are 
mutually constituted over time. And part of the distinctive nature of 
legalized norms in this view involves the important (if sometimes 
amorphous) element of legal legitimacy, supported in part by the 
interaction between law and collective social practice.190 
To an important degree, discussions of international law drawing 
from constructivist theoretical frameworks reject the instrumentalist 
state choice element of rationalist institutionalism. But this hardly 
suggests either that purposeful legal action disappears from the account 
or that the role of less deliberately chosen principles in legal work is 
promoted to the center of attention. In characterizing purposeful action, 
constructivist scholars have tended to suggest that states may enter into 
international legal instruments of various sorts not to promote 
unwavering interests in maximizing security, power, or wealth, but rather 
in support of historically contingent political or moral principles (or 
historically contingent understandings of security and economic interest) 
that they deem to be legitimate and valuable. In surveying the literature 
for an edited volume building on the insights of constructivist scholarship, 
and quite explicitly designed to be “read as a counterpoint to the ‘rationalist’ 
approach,” Christian Reus-Smit notes that actors create institutions, 
including international legal institutions, “not only as functional solutions to 
co-operation problems, but also as expressions of prevailing conceptions of 
legitimate agency and action that serve, in turn, as structuring frameworks 
for the communicative politics of legitimation.”191  
In characterizing norm-based thinking on treaties, Oona Hathaway 
notes that “governments create and comply with treaties not only 
because they expect a reward for doing so, but also because of their 
commitment (or the commitment of transnational actors that influence 
them) to the norms or ideas embodied in the treaties.”192 While the state 
remains a key actor in these processes of social construction and identity 
formation, non-state actors including international institutions, domestic 
 
 189. See, e.g., James G. March & Johan P. Olsen, The Institutional Dynamics of International Political 
Orders, 52 Int’l Org. 943, 951 (1998). 
 190. See, e.g., Martha Finnemore & Stephen J. Toope, Alternatives to “Legalization”: Richer Views of 
Law and Politics, 55 Int’l Org. 743, 744 (2001); Jutta Brunnée & Stephen J. Toope, Legitimacy and 
Legality in International Law: An Interactional Account 75 (2010). 
 191. The Politics of International Law 5 (Christian Reus-Smit ed., 2004). Reus-Smit specifically 
identifies the 2000 Legalization and World Politics special issue of International Organization, mentioned 
in text above, as paradigmatic of the rationalist approach the volume aims to challenge. Id. at 11. 
 192. Hathaway, supra note 35, at 47. 
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and transnational interest groups, nongovernmental organizations, and 
even individuals also play an important role in this element of choice and 
agency. Providing one key example, Martha Finnemore and Kathryn 
Sikkink have highlighted the role of “norm entrepreneurs,” who very 
deliberately promote particular visions of appropriate conduct and who 
work to eliminate alternatives in order to further their values and 
beliefs.193 Thus, this scholarship on shared beliefs in international legal 
processes, while emphasizing the ways in which norms can actively 
constitute law and actors, has still paid less attention to the role played 
by more quiet assumptions about markets and their causal effect. 
Perhaps deepening this tendency to overlook the role of market 
principles, constructivist work in international law, like variants of 
rationalist institutionalism, has also sometimes assumed a continuum of 
effectiveness that corresponds to the “hardness” or at least the 
“legalness” of the law in question. Suggesting the greater strength of 
more concrete legal forms, Finnemore notes that, “[p]articularly for new 
or emergent normative claims where few ‘hard’ law obligations exist, 
activists seek to generate this kind of felt obligation as a means of 
promoting ‘harder’ legal obligations in the future.”194 Implying an 
intermediate or stepping-stone character of soft law, David Trubek notes 
that such instruments may help to develop “non-binding standards that 
can eventually harden into binding rules once uncertainties are reduced 
and a higher degree of consensus ensues.”195 And a consideration of 
practice confirms this dynamic across multiple issue areas. For example, 
legally binding environmental treaties such as the Montreal Protocol on 
Substances Depleting the Ozone Layer, now involving third-party review 
of implementation, progressed from more aspirational language 
developed by key non-state and state supporters.196 And perhaps the 
greatest success understood along these lines is the adoption of the 
Landmines Convention in 1997, only five years after the launch of the 
campaign to ban landmines by six NGOs in 1992.197 
Jutta Brunnée and Stephen Toope, also working from a constructivist 
perspective, offer a valuable caveat here, cautioning “against undue faith 
 
 193. Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, International Norm Dynamics and Political Change, 
52 Int’l Org. 887–917 (1998). 
 194. Martha Finnemore, New Directions, New Collaborations for International Law and International 
Relations, in International Law and International Relations: Bridging Theory and Practice 271 
(Thomas J. Biersteker et al. eds., 2007). 
 195. David M. Trubek et al., ‘Soft Law,’ ‘Hard Law,’ and EU Integration, in Law and New Governance 
in the EU and the US 89 (Gráinne De Búrca & Joanne Scott eds., 2006). 
 196. See, e.g., Brunnée & Toope, supra note 190, at 126–219 (providing further information on the 
development of the climate regime). 
 197. Richard Price, Emerging Customary Norms and Anti-Personnel Landmines, in The Politics 
of International Law, supra note 191. 
Lienau-68.3.doc (Do Not Delete) 5/25/2017  8:39 PM 
April 2017]          MARKET PRINCIPLES IN THE GLOBAL LEGAL ORDER 601 
in formal law-making.”198 They draw from Lon Fuller’s previously 
mentioned theory of the rule of law to develop an interactional account of 
international legal obligation that emphasizes the centrality of ongoing and 
shared practices of legality in creating and maintaining law.199 Brunnée and 
Toope thus disrupt the assumption of a clear hierarchy among legal forms, 
allowing for the possibility that less formal codes may more effectively 
generate a sense of legal obligation, which they consider to be “the value-
added of law.”200 They note that “it is not enough to cast socially shared 
understandings in legal form . . . [W]ithout sufficiently dense interactions 
and participation of its members, positive law will remain, or become, dead 
letter.”201 
Brunnée and Toope’s project resonates with my own in shifting 
attention away from what is called law and instead focusing on the 
various criteria of legality and the multiple ways and forms in which such 
criteria may be met. But the focus on identifying law for the purpose of 
understanding legal obligation differs from my effort to understand how 
market principles function as a type of law in global governance. While 
legal obligation may indeed be a central value-added of law, it is also the 
case that certain rules that we now understand without much controversy 
to be worthy of study as part of international law do not in fact provide 
this element, at least not in much depthcertain informal rules on 
banking, perhaps, or even the “dead letter” hard law we nonetheless 
require our students to understand (and maybe criticize, helping to ensure 
it remains dead). Indeed, certain types of market beliefs may meet 
important criteria of legality and act as law without generating a subjective 
sense of legal obligationwithout being recognized or felt as law. Again, 
my goal in making this suggestion is not to contend that these market 
principles should in fact generate felt legal obligation or that they should 
be applied by decisionmaking bodies as if they do generate such 
obligation. Rather, the goal is to put them at the core of legal analysis and 
criticism. 
C. Critical Law and Disciplinary Boundaries 
All that said, certain insights drawn from constructivism clearly 
resonate with this Article’s understanding of the potential roles of 
market principles in international law. In particular, studies of how shared 
understandings may shape and predetermine meaning and interest have 
informed my thinking. Constructivist and critical work in the political 
 
 198. Brunnée & Toope, supra note 190, at 75. 
 199. Brunnée and Toope list the criteria of legality as: generality, promulgation, nonretroactivity, clarity, 
noncontradiction, not asking the impossible, constancy, and congruence between rules and official action. Id. 
at 6. 
 200. Id. at 77. 
 201. Id. at 69–70. 
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science subfield of international political economy, which questions the 
possibility of a purely materialist theory of market functioning, emphasizes 
that “international norms define the boundaries of choice and thereby 
affect how societies, policymakers, and market participants discern the 
meaning of various policy stances.”202 These collective ideas become most 
powerful when they are taken for grantedwhen actors accept them as 
the only realistic response to a given issue rather than one among several 
plausible policy choices.203 And research on epistemic communities, 
which has looked at knowledge-based networks organized around 
technical areas such as science or economics, has demonstrated the 
impact of shared understandings that gain authority in part from 
perceptions of expertise and impartiality.204 
To an important degree, these insights from related disciplines do 
resonate with elements found in international law studies, particularly 
with those variants of critical international legal scholarship that attend 
to the effect of background narratives and collective beliefs. At a 
theoretical level, scholars have highlighted how such background ideas 
construct elements of international law, and also how these ideas are 
shapedand indeed are shaped as backgroundby the concepts and 
practice of international law itself. For example, Martti Koskenniemi has 
highlighted that “[t]he law constructs its own field of application as it goes 
along, through a normative language that highlights some aspects of the 
world while leaving other aspects in the dark.”205 Fleur Johns demonstrates 
through a range of close case studies how international lawyers “make non-
law . . . that is, routinely shape understandings of what stands opposed to or 
outside the reach of legal norms.”206 David Kennedy has written of how 
knowledge practices and expertise, including legal and institutional 
expertise, shape our understanding of the world (and thus shape the world 
itself)for example, by marking out certain economic frameworks and 
activities as natural or inevitable and insulating them from political 
contestation.207 Kennedy argues that participants in global governance 
“underestimate the plasticity and policy potential of what they take to be 
 
 202. Abdelal, supra note 55, at 9. 
 203. See, e.g., id. at 10–11. Constructivist theory outside of political economy also emphasizes the power 
attaching to a norm when it achieves this “taken for granted” character. 
 204. See, e.g., Haas, supra note 126, at 1–35 (1992); Adler, supra note 126. 
 205. Martti Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal 
Argument 570 (2005). 
 206. Fleur Johns, Non-Legality in International Law: Unruly Law 1 (2011). Johns further notes 
that this constrains what is considered politically possible: “lawyers’ practice of making non-legalities 
entails the continual making and remaking of global political possibilities.” Id. at 1. 
 207. See generally David Kennedy, A World of Struggle: How Power, Law, and Expertise Shape 
Global Political Economy (2016). Kennedy developed these arguments through a series of earlier pieces. 
See, e.g., David Kennedy, International Legal Theory: Law and the Political Economy of the World, 
26 Leiden J. Int’l L. 7, 12–13, 40–41 (2013) [hereinafter Kennedy, International Legal Theory]. 
Lienau-68.3.doc (Do Not Delete) 5/25/2017  8:39 PM 
April 2017]          MARKET PRINCIPLES IN THE GLOBAL LEGAL ORDER 603 
the ‘background’” and also fail to fully recognize “their own complicity in 
what they see as background.”208 Focusing on ideas of democracy in 
international legal practice, Susan Marks uses the concept of ideology to 
emphasize how meaning and ideas (including legal meaning) can sustain 
relations of domination, and notes the international legal relevance of the 
concept of reification, developed by Georg Lukács, to describe “a process 
by which human products come to appear as if they were material things, 
and then to dominate those who produced them.”209 
Why, then, are these insights not already closer to the core of 
mainstream international law scholarship and practice?210 And, relatedly, 
why have market principles not fully entered our conception of global law 
through this scholarly pathway? The critical scholars just mentioned are 
engaged in an uncovering project of sortsan effort to bring understudied 
but significant issues into legal vision, even to make them part of “law,” 
broadly understood. Johns notes that part of her aim is “to make politically 
navigable and questionable some aspect(s) of international legal work 
previously, for the most part, un- or under-acknowledged.”211 Kennedy calls 
upon international lawyers to recognize their own disciplinary 
assumptionsincluding their narratives and knowledge practicesas part 
of policymaking, governance, and rulership, and to embrace the political 
contestation and choice within these activities.212 
But, in a way, the language and framing of these arguments may not 
always further the goal of encouraging more direct engagement by a 
broader swathe of the legal profession. Indeed, they may even work at 
 
 208. David Kennedy, The Politics of the Invisible College: International Governance and the Politics 
of Expertise, 5 Eur. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 463, 491 (2001) [hereinafter Kennedy, The Politics of the 
Invisible College].  
 209. Susan Marks uses John Thompson’s formulation of ideology as “ways in which meaning serves 
to establish and sustain relations of domination.” Susan Marks, The Riddle of All Constitutions: 
International Law, Democracy, and the Critique of Ideology 10 (2000). For discussion on reification, 
see id. at 21. Indeed, we could go even further back to Karl Marx himself, the grandfather of studies of 
law, ideology, and political economy. 
 210. Beyond these theoretical insights, more specific studies by these scholars resonate with the 
arguments in this Article about how market principles can work in the global legal order. For example, 
Johns’ chapters on “pre-legality” in cross-border investment deals and “supra-legality” in the international 
legal treatment of climate science are very relevant. Johns, supra note 206. Also of importance is David 
Kennedy’s frequently cited article on the post-Cold War narratives shaping West European engagements 
with the post-Communist countries of Eastern Europe. David Kennedy, Turning to Market Democracy: A 
Tale of Two Architectures, 32 Harv. Int’l L.J. 373 (1991). 
 211. Johns, supra note 206, at 9. Echoing Kennedy’s suggestion: 
[That] [i]f international law and lawyers are shown to be complicit in constituting and/or 
entrenching that which they purport to stand against . . . then attributions of responsibility and 
questions of reform might emerge that are different to those currently circulating in much 
contemporary international legal literature. 
Id. 
 212. See, e.g., Kennedy, International Legal Theory, supra note 207, at 37, 40; Kennedy, The Politics of 
the Invisible College, supra note 208, at 495–96. 
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cross-purposes. In particular, lawyers and legal scholars ultimately (and 
understandably) are most comfortable working with and within “law.” 
Even those attorneys who do not conceive of themselves as mere 
functionaries will probably prefer to engage in their practice and 
professional projects in a recognizably legal manner. Requesting that 
they also expressly adopt political struggle, non-law, ideology, or the 
dark spaces left by law’s “going along” (in Koskenniemi’s words) is, 
potentially, a significant pivot away from their disciplinary comfort zone. 
Kennedy seems to understand this difficulty, and quite explicitly aims to 
inspire or exhort attorneys to political consciousness. But asking them to 
cast off their disciplinary selves to emerge (like superman, perhaps) as 
Weberian politicians might be too muchmany lawyers, perhaps 
unfortunately, have not entered the profession to confront politics and 
be faced with the burden of political choice at every turn.  
Similarly, Johns acknowledges that she adopts a vocabulary of “non-
legalities” that lawyers tend not to use.213 Indeed, the harried law firm 
associate featured in Johns’ study of the micro-foundations and pre-
legalities of a cross-border investment deal is no doubt only too grateful 
to rely on those pre-legalities, and to avoid further expanding her 
analytical duties to include recognition of the non-legality shaped 
through her own legal work. Even as many lawyers and legal scholars are 
enriched by these important reframings, others will resist (and even 
resent) the conceptual moves. These critical analyses represent a real 
paradigm shifta simultaneous elevation and diminution of legal 
activityfor a professional group historically committed to the uniqueness 
of its disciplinary practice, identity, and distinctive forms of reasoning. 
Furthermore, this paradigm shift is not entirely necessary. The 
concept of law itselfparticularly in its current expansive manifestation 
in the international arenais already sufficiently broad and flexible to 
include market principles. The point is not only to make the functioning 
of these market givens visible, which they are to some degree in other 
fields, but to make them visible as law and as engaging in cognizably 
legal functionality. Lawyers have a range of analytical methods and 
questions for dealing with lawlex in Latinthat are entirely 
appropriate for approaching a kind of lex clandestinus or lex furtivus, but 
translate somewhat more awkwardly to the framework of ideology, non-
law, or knowledge practices. In some ways, critical international legal 
scholars have shared with rational choice and constructivist scholars a 
willingness to accept the conventional conceptual boundaries of law, in 
that they seem to implicitly concur that the components of law and of a 
 
 213. Johns, supra note 206, at 1. 
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legal order itself must be deliberately chosen.214 Despite the embrace of 
immanent critique, there has been insufficient recognition of the critical 
potential immanent within the category of law itself. 
In sum, multiple variants of international legal scholarshipby 
implicitly or explicitly assuming that international rules must result from 
deliberate choicehave tended to ignore the possibility that certain 
collective understandings may act as law without aspiring to be 
recognized as such. This disregard pushes the legal functioning of these 
market principles further from critical scrutiny, especially when 
compared to the substantial scholarly activity directed at other areas now 
included within (but traditionally excluded from) international law, 
including informal soft law guidelineslex mercatoriaand normative 
concepts and principles. And to the extent that scholarship helps to 
shape the broader understanding and treatment of rules that we live 
under, the insufficient (or insufficiently direct) treatment of market 
principles in legal scholarship may help to entrench their quiet and 
under-examined power globally. This means that market principles have 
many of the benefits of lawas being politically constructed directives 
that command a significant degree of power and adherencewithout the 
attendant scrutiny usually accorded to law. By contrast, I hope that 
identifying how market givens act as a type of law, albeit a hidden and 
sometimes problematic law, can help to put them squarely at the center 
of such examination. 
Conclusion: The Sailing Ship of International Legal Expansion 
It may come as a surprise that, although I nest these arguments about 
market principles within expanded understandings of international law, I 
actually wish to remain agnostic on whether this conceptual expansion of 
law has been an entirely good thing. Almost three decades ago, Sally Engle 
Merry expressed concern that “calling all forms of ordering that are not state 
law by the term law confounds the analysis.”215 And scholars such as Jean 
d’Aspremont note that lawyerly scrutiny can be employed without 
expanding the idea of international law itself. Indeed, it might be a problem 
that legal analysts seem unwilling or unable to direct their examination 
beyond legal boundaries: 
 
 214. This may result, in part, from an understanding of international law as grounded in “what 
international lawyers say and do.” Id. at 12; see sources and quotations provided id. at 12 n.24. Although I 
agree with this flexible practice-based framework to an extent, this provides insufficient conceptual space 
for thinking through the ways in which market givens function in (and as) international law as well. 
 215. Sally Engle Merry, Legal Pluralism, 22 Law & Soc’y Rev. 869, 878 (1988). 
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[I]nternational legal scholars are uneasy when grappling with a given 
question without including it in the realm of international law. It is as if 
international legal scholars cannot zero-in on non-legal phenomena 
without feeling a need to label them as law. . . . One continues to wonder, 
however, why international legal scholars cannot study the phenomenon 
without portraying it as a legal phenomenon.216 
In some ways, this concern resonates with the encouragement from 
critical scholars and also law and society scholars to look beyond the 
traditional boundaries of law itself, though d’Aspremont has a different 
theoretical perspective. While this is certainly fair, and indeed I do not 
disagree that lawyers should feel free to look beyond the boundaries of 
law, I also worry about the degree to which these exhortations are likely 
to be successful. Certainly international legal scholars can study 
phenomena without portraying them as legal. But will they to the same 
extent? And will they study and criticize them in similar types of ways? 
Part of my goal here is to lower the conceptual and analytical threshold 
for engagement, and to encourage the more widespread application of a 
lawyerly analytical toolkit to market principles. 
Furthermore, I wonder if this concern tends to over-essentialize the 
category or concept of law itself. A narrower understanding of the 
concept of international law may be useful for certain political 
projectsincluding, perhaps, the important project of protecting state 
sovereignty. So I leave others to debate whether it is best, as a normative 
matter, to insist that the classic, state consent-based sources of law should 
be defended against encroachment, particularly in courts and other 
decisionmaking bodies. But this is ultimately an argument about political 
and doctrinal strategy, and does not necessarily undermine the idea that 
the conceptual family of law itself is broad enough to include market 
principles. 
Of course, it is possible that by participating in this expansioneven 
if only at the level of theorythis Article entrenches it further. While 
this is a fair concern, my own perspective is that the ship of expanding 
international law has already sailed. If that is the case, the focus should 
be on a careful consideration of the distinctions between more or less 
acceptable law, and, relatedly, on which law should be challenged and 
remade. My suspicion is that many market principles, subjected to this 
analysis, will be found lacking not only in inevitability but also in those 
factors that might lead actors to consider a legal rule to be legitimate. To 
the extent that a normative hierarchy is thought to existat least in the 
 
 216. Jean d’Aspremont, Epistemic Forces in International Law: Foundational Doctrines and 
Techniques of International Legal Argumentation 57–58 (2015); see also Jean d’Aspremont, From a 
Pluralization of International Norm-Making Processes to a Pluralization of the Concept of International Law, 
in Informal International Lawmaking, supra note 134, at 199. 
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arguments and atmospherics that can impact reputational judgments and 
so shape a state’s policy spacemarket principles are unlikely to stand at 
the apex. But if they stand outside of these questions altogether, they may 
well come out ahead without much thought or scrutiny. Writing in the 
context of legal pluralism, and with concern for protecting independent 
normative orders, Ralf Michaels has noted that, “[t]he power of non-
state norms may lie in their otherness, in their character as non-law. This 
power is easily reduced, these non-state orders are domesticated, once 
we reconceptualize these norms as law.”217 While the application and 
motivation is different, this basic insight is relevant: Reframing a 
phenomenon as “law” can have a domesticating and demystifying effect. 
To the extent that international legal scholarship has already accepted 
the step of conceptual expansion, we lose considerable powerrelative 
to market principles themselvesby not including them within the 
conceptual family of global law. 
 
 217. Ralf Michaels, The Re-state-ment of Non-State Law: The State, Choice of Law, and the Challenge 
from Global Legal Pluralism, 51 Wayne L. Rev. 1209, 1257 (2005). 
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